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ABSTRACT 
Large aircraft are important assets in the military, as well as in civilian 
aviation. Today, the threat is not only in the battlespace but is also emerging and 
distributed throughout all the places where large aircraft operate. The threat has 
expanded due to new developments in advancing missile technology. This study 
is meant to be a comprehensive guide for non-technical aircrew and an 
introduction for technical personnel by defining threat technologies, detection 
systems and systems to counter today’s surface-to-air missile technologies and 
possible future developments. Countermeasures are expressed both scientifically 
and operationally with examples from the current market. The emerging threats 
of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs) and infrared technology are 
also reviewed. The hardness of flying platforms and survivability issues are 
explained, including the latest examples from operations in Iraq. 
The goal of this study is to assist in the design or modernization of a large 
aircraft with equipment according to new demands both in the battlespace and in 
normal civilian operations. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As information propagates from one place to another at the speed of light, 
the race between the air defense systems and the aircraft self-protection systems 
becomes more challenging. In this race, new disciplines and study areas arise. 
Technological developments lead to smaller and more powerful electronics 
components. Moreover, the proliferation of surface-to-air missiles makes it 
difficult to predict where or when those threats will be encountered. This 
circumstance increases the demand to protect the large aircraft, not only in the 
military but also in civilian aviation. This study is a comprehensive guide to the 
self-defense of large aircraft. It describes the threats and the technology behind 
it, explains the susceptibilities of the large aircraft, analyzes different methods of 
detecting the threat according to various technologies, and tries to find an 
integrated solution to defeat the threat. If the aircraft is hit, then it finds 
approaches to increase survivability. Therefore, it brings together the operational 
and scientific areas for not only aircrew and maintenance personnel but also 
technical personnel so that they may understand the systematic chain of events 
from detecting the threat until the aircraft survives or is killed.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Large aircraft are an essential part of military and civilian aviation. They 
are employed in different missions such as transportation, aerial delivery, 
bombing, refueling, and early airborne warning. Since each of these strategic 
missions directly or indirectly supports military operations, their absence has a 
significant impact on the large scale of battle. The importance of large aircraft 
can be appreciated most when they are lost. Their loss can also have 
considerable psychological effects on friendly forces and sensational ones on 
adversary forces. Therefore, they must be protected against all threats. In this 
thesis, the main objective is to describe the threats and the best solutions to 
counter them, familiarizing non-technical personnel, namely aircrews, with the 
technology behind the guidance and sensor systems that are in use today. In 
addition, potential future developments are reviewed. Although this thesis covers 
large aircraft, this subject is valid for every kind of air vehicle. The author 
matched both technology and practical application in the thesis. 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
In this study, different types of threat technologies are researched by 
trying to find common solutions for different types of threats in different 
environments, ranging from low-threat to high-threat, to protect the large aircraft. 
C. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Major Question 
How does a large, slow-flying aircraft survive in a battlespace threatened 
by missiles throughout the entire mission profile?  
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2. Subsidiary Questions 
• What are the threats for aircraft and their technology? 
• What are the susceptibilities of large aircraft?  
• How can a threat be detected?  
• How can a threat be countered? 
• What kind of countermeasures are there in this area?  
• What happens when a missile hits an aircraft?  
• What will be the technology of the future?  
• Is it worth equipping large aircraft with countermeasures?  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been a significant number of studies in electronic warfare 
(EW) and defense technologies. As time goes on, new conflicts and wars break 
out, causing more articles and books to be written about the specific areas.  
In The Infrared and Electro-optical Systems Handbook1 and the radar 
books, the technology is described separately. New books in this area do not 
cover some other aspects or “why” questions. 
This study fills the gaps in how to equip large aircraft to address all 
possible guided missiles. Therefore, it does not necessarily explain all kinds of 
missiles or all kinds of EW technologies. 
E. IMPORTANCE AND THE BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The past studies in this particular area do not address and show complete 
self-defense of large aircraft against surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). This study is 
meant to fill the gap by bringing together all the studies related to this particular 
area. It includes both current and possible future threats and solutions. 
                                            
1 J. S. Accetta and David L. Shumaker, The Infrared and Electro-Optical Systems Handbook 
(Ann Arbor, MI; Bellingham, WA: Infrared Information Analysis Center; SPIE Optical Engineering 
Press, 1993). 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter I presents an 
overview to the thesis. The thesis has continuity, as it is visualized in Figure 1; it 
begins with Chapter I, which is an overview and introduction. Chapter II 
describes the characteristics, capabilities, and technology of the threat. Chapter 
III puts forward the vulnerabilities of large aircraft. To counter a threat, first, it 
should be detected and identified clearly; therefore, Chapter IV describes 
detection of threats. Chapter V reviews solutions to counter different kinds of 
threats. Chapter VI argues how a large aircraft can survive when struck by a 
missile. Chapter VII is the conclusion. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Organization of chapters. 
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Examples, but not necessarily all possible examples, of current systems 
are described, embedded in the pertinent sections, within the format shown in 
Table 1. 
 
System Name (Company Name) 
Description: Brief description of the system
 
Features: Special features 
 
Table 1.   Example of a system application. 
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II. MISSILES AS A THREAT 
A. MISSILES 
Missiles are categorized according to their guidance features. SAMs are 
used for shooting down flying objects and, as a second objective, seeking virtual 
attrition, which means preventing the enemy from executing its mission. Aircraft 
fly high to avoid being shot down because the precision and accuracy of 
unguided missiles decrease with altitude. Guided missiles were developed 
against aircraft because artillery systems became insufficient to shoot down a 
high-flying target. Guided missiles opened a new era in air defense, in terms of 
accuracy, precision and shoot-down rates of potential attacks. A missile block 
diagram is in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   A typical guided missile.  
The radome protects the antenna or sensor of the seeker and reduces 
drag. The seeker detects the target and generates signals for the guidance 
system. The warhead consists of explosives to destroy the target. The fuze 
assures the detonation of the warhead if it does not hit the target and explode 
directly. The guidance system commands the control fins. To hit an aircraft, a 
missile has to carry out some consecutive stages. The aircraft should be 
searched for, detected, and tracked. Then, the missile should be launched and 
flown out to the target. The most challenging electromagnetic aspects of these 
processes occur in the early warning, acquisition and flyout phase of missile 
because most electronic warfare happens in this region. 
 
 




The effectiveness of the missile is directly related to its flight performance, 
guidance type, trajectory, fuze, warhead and sensor it uses. 
B. PHASES OF MISSILE GUIDANCE 
Almost all SAM systems have three phases during flyout: boost, mid-
course, and terminal.  
 
Figure 3.   Phases of missile guidance. 
1. Boost (Launch)   
During the boost phase, the guidance systems are usually disabled to 
allow the missile to safely travel away from the launch platform. 
Unless the missile employs a propulsion system that does not emit heat 
sources, it emits visible, infrared (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) signatures from the 
exhaust and the exhaust plume of the missile during the launch phase. Those 




The missile spends most of its flight time in the mid-course phase. Using 
the guidance system, the missile makes slight adjustments to intercept its target. 
3. Terminal 
The missile maintains accurate tracking to intercept the target in the 
terminal phase. 
The boost and mid-course (or sustain) phases provide the most 
characteristic emissions in the optical bands. During the terminal phase, the 
signature becomes less or burns out. “Discrete frequency emissions from 
rotational and vibrational transitions of water vapor and carbon dioxide molecules 
account for much of the exhaust emission.”2 Those observables are the most 
important detection and guidance information for missile warning receivers 
(MWRs.) 
C. MISSILE GUIDANCE TYPES 
Guidance is the vital issue in missiles since it steers the missile from the 
surface to the maneuvering aircraft. 
Different types of missiles are classified according to their guidance types. 
Typically, different resources may slightly rearrange the classifications but, 
generally, the types of guidance are: active, semi-active, command, beam-riding, 
retransmission, passive, and imaging guidance. Some missiles employ more 
than one guidance method during the different flight stages. 
                                            
2 Accetta and Shumaker, 1993, 18. 
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1. Active Guidance 
a. System Principle 
In active guidance, the missile has its own small radar. Since the 
radar is built into the missile, there is no need for an external data or command to 
be followed. But in application, this function is not used during the whole flight. 
Once a missile is fired, it travels to the general area of the target by means of 
inertial or command guidance, then turns on its radar, acquires the target, and 
guides itself to impact with the target. Usually, missile radars are used in the last 
ten kilometers of the attack. i.e., in the terminal engagement. 
b. Pros 
The platform firing the missile can leave the area immediately after 
launch. Since they do not need any assistance after launch, they are also called 
“fire and forget” missiles. Guidance becomes more accurate as the range to the 
target diminishes.  
c. Cons 
These systems are heavier and more expensive. They can be used 
only once. They radiate radio frequency (RF) energy, which means they can be 




Figure 4.   Active guidance. 
d. Susceptibilities to Jamming 
These modern systems are equipped with pulse Doppler radar and 
become very hard to jam at close range (because the radar power on the target 











⋅ ⋅ ⋅=   
In Table 2, some of the missiles, which use active guidance in their 
particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
SA-5 Terminal  RF 
MBDA Aster Terminal RF 
MEADS Terminal  RF 
Patriot(PAC3) Terminal RF 
HQ7  RF+IR+TV 
Roland  RF 
Table 2.   Some missiles that employ active guidance. 
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2. Semi-active Guidance 
a. System Principle 
In semi-active guidance, there is no transmitter aboard. Signals 
transmitted by a ground or air defense system radar are scattered from both the 
target and other objects. The receiver on the missile receives the scattered 
signals. Only reflected aircraft signals can pass through the Doppler filter. Radar 
illuminates the target by a continuous wave (CW), interrupted continuous wave 
(ICW), or high pulse repetition frequency (PRF) pulses. ICW permits control of 
more than one missile. Semi-active guidance operates similar to bistatic radar or 
a laser-guided weapon.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Semi-active guidance. 
b. Pros 
Since the missile follows the reflected signals, the illuminating 
source should not stop transmitting. The seeker and the maneuverability of the 
missile have greater roles in hitting the target precisely.  
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c. Susceptibilities to Jamming 
A CW system may calculate the angle data in a narrow band. The 
extremely narrow processing band (1 kilohertz on a carrier of many gigahertz) 
prevents the system from being jammed easily. When the missile fire control 
turns on its illuminator, this usually means that a missile launch is near. While the 
missile is in flight, either the tracking radar must be forced to break lock, or the 
missile must be jammed. A conical scan missile seeker is more susceptible to 
jamming than a monopulse one.3 
Obscuration of the illumination terminates the lock. For example, a 
low-flying aircraft can maneuver behind a terrain feature to obscure itself from the 
radar. 
In Table 3, some of the missiles, which use semi-active guidance in 
their particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
SA-4 Terminal RF 
SA-6 Terminal RF 
SA-11  RF 
SA-N-6  RF+IR 
SA-12  RF 
SA-17  RF 
Aspide  
(multirole) 




HQ-9  RF 
HAWK  RF 
RIM-7   
RIM-66M Terminal with passive, (Midcourse 
Inertial) 
RF+IR 
RIM-156 Terminal RF 
RIM-161 Terminal with passive RF+IR 
RIM-162 Terminal RF 
Sea Dart  RF 
Table 3.   Some missiles that employ semi-active guidance. 
                                            
3 Filippo Neri, Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Artech 
House, 2001), 239.  
 12
3. Command Guidance  
a. System Principle 
A missile seeker is not required. The missile depends on another 
platform to receive commands regarding where to go. There are two radars: one 
for tracking the target and one for missile guidance. If a single radar is employed 
for both duties, then the missile is commanded to stay within the radar beam, 
which is called command-to-line-of-sight (CLOS). The computer calculates 
received positions of the missile and the target to generate the missile’s 
trajectory for the impact point. A missile sensor, which is mounted on the 
platform, tracks the target and calculates its path of flight. Then the missile 
explodes at the aircraft’s predicted position.  
The further away from the energy source, the greater the 
degradation of accuracy and guidance. The target must be illuminated often 
enough to assure guidance effectiveness, but this inhibits the ability to engage 
more targets. Some missiles use more than one guidance method. For example, 
command guidance may be used for mid-course and active guidance for the 
terminal phase.  
 
Figure 6.   Command guidance.4 
                                            




This system is simple and the missile is relatively cheaper since it 
does not have a seeker.  
c. Cons 
The power and accuracy of the missile-tracking radar is essential to 
guide the missile precisely. As the radar-to-target range increases, the 
effectiveness of the system decreases due to angular accuracy between the two 
radars. Therefore, they are mostly used in short-range missiles.  
d. Susceptibilities to Jamming 
The data link can be jammed. 
In Table 4, some of the missiles, which use command guidance in 
their particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
Nike Hercules  RF 
Patriot Mid-course(TVM) RF 
SA-1  RF 
SA-2  RF 
SA-3  RF 
SA-4 Mid-course is command RF 
SA-5 Mid-course (Terminal active) RF 
SA-6 Mid-course RF 
SA-8  RF 
SA-15  RF 
Akash  RF 
Barak  RF 
KS-1  RF 
Rapier +passive RF+IR 
Sea Cat CLOS via a radio link  
Sea Wolf  RF 
Crotale +TVguidance (regular+IR) RF+IR 
Trishul  RF 
Starstreak SACLOS  
Table 4.   Some missiles that employ command guidance. 
 14
4. Beam-riding Guidance  
a. System Principle 
There is one radar for tracking the target and the missile has only 
an onboard receiver. The missile always centers within the radar beam; 
therefore, as the radar track’s boresight moves, the missile continuously aligns 
itself. Since the missile is faster than the target, eventually, the intercept occurs. 
This often requires very large missile maneuvers, so it is not commonly used in 
airborne missile guidance. Integrated closed-circuit TV may improve system 
performance. Laser usage is becoming more common since its dispersion by 
range is less and it is more difficult to detect laser illumination than it is to detect 




Figure 7.   Beam-riding guidance.5 
                                            
5 Ball, 389. 
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b. Pros 
It is a simple system. There is no need to command-link. Many 
missiles can follow one beam. 
c. Cons 
Since it follows the radar beams, even if the target flies a straight 
path, the missile makes many maneuvers, which causes speed loss and long 
flight time. The beam must be very narrow; otherwise, it will not be precise. This 
dictates a short-range system. 
In Table 5, some of the missiles, which use beam-riding guidance 
in their particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
Terrier(RIM2-C)   
ADATS Digitally coded laser beam Laser 
Sea Slug  RF 
RBS70 Laser beam Laser 
Starstreak Laser beam Laser 
Table 5.   Some missiles that employ beam-riding guidance. 
5. Inertial Navigation Guidance 
This type of guidance navigates with onboard gyros and accelerometers. 
Mostly, it is used for the launch and mid-course phases of a missile’s flight. Then, 
beginning from the late period of mid-course to the terminal phase, more precise 
guidance methods are used. 
In Table 6, some of the missiles, which use inertial navigation guidance in 





Missile Name Phase of Flight 
CLAWS (HUMRAAM) mid course (terminal 
active RF) 
MEADS Mid-course 
Nike Hercules Mid-course 
Table 6.   Some missiles that employ inertial navigation guidance. 
6.  Retransmission Guidance 
a. System Principle 
The radar system illuminates the target and both the ground radar 
system and the missile’s receiver receive reflected signals from target. The target 
information is also relayed from the missile to the ground system via downlink. 
Therefore, this system is also called, “track via missile” (TVM). The principle of 
retransmission guidance is similar to semi-active or command guidance.  
b. Pros 
A two-way link between the missile and the ground station enables 
precise and flexible tracking. 
c. Cons 
Complexity. Some TVM systems have problems tracking targets 
at very low altitudes due to line-of-sight problems between missile and ground 
station. 
d. Susceptibilities to Jamming 




Figure 8.   Retransmission guidance.6 
In Table 7, some of the missiles, which use retransmission 
guidance in their particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
Patriot(PAC-2) Terminal RF 
SA-10  RF 
MBDA Aster Mid-course RF 
RIM-162 Mid-course  RF 
SA-20  RF 
Table 7.   Some missiles that employ inertial navigation guidance. 
7. Passive Guidance 
a. System Principle 
In passive guidance, the missile homes in on some emission from 
the target. Infrared missiles, anti-radiation, and home-on-jam missiles are good 
examples. Once the track is established and the missile fired, then, as in active 
guidance, the launching platform can leave the area.  
 
                                            
6 Ball, 391. 
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Figure 9.   Passive guidance. 
b. Pros 
They are relatively simple and cheaper systems. Once they are 
fired, there is no more ground guidance.  
c. Cons 
They have shorter ranges. 
d. Susceptibilities to Jamming 
They are very susceptible to jamming because the radiation can be 
imitated easily.  
In Table 8, some of the missiles, which use passive guidance in 
their particular phase of flight and sensor type, are shown. 
 
Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
Stinger  IR/UV 
RAM Terminal: Passive IR RF/IR 
SA-7  IR 
SA-9 Passive IR IR 
SA-13  IR 
SA-14  IR 
SA-16  IR 
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Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
SA-18  IR 
Redeye Tail chase only IR 
Chaparral Aim-9 based Passive IR 
Anza   
Mistral  IR 
Umkhonto All-aspect IR IR 
RIM-116 Passive RF/ Passive IR IR+RF 
Table 8.   Some missiles that employ passive guidance. 
8. Imaging Guidance 
In guidance methods, the trend is towards using imaging guidance for 
relatively short distances. Therefore, this topic is emphasized more than others. 
An imaging-guided missile captures the image of a target and centers that 
image in its field of view. Imaging guidance can come in different types, such as 
television (TV), scanning IR, staring IR imager, and correlation trackers. SAMs 
may use correlation trackers and typically use a 3–5 μm range. 
An automatic video tracking system maintains a stable line of sight. The 
target is recognized by either a manual or an automatic target recognition 
system. In Figure 10, there is an aircraft in the missile’s field of view. The values 










 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
14 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
13 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
12 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 13 13 10 10 10
11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12 13 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 14 13 10 10 10
9 10 10 10 11 11 13 14 15 13 13 14 15 12 10 10 10
8 10 10 11 15 14 20 23 23 22 18 18 16 14 11 10 10
7 10 10 15 14 14 15 16 17 19 18 16 10 10 10 10 10
6 10 10 10 11 11 11 14 14 12 11 10 10 10 10 10 10
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Figure 10.   Image tracking. 
The centroid of the target can be defined as the binary or intensity 
centroid. 
In Figure 11, the background, which has the value of 10, is eliminated by 
binary thresholding. After thresholding, the binary values are multiplied by the 






































The intensity or weighted centroid is calculated by first removing 
background, then following the same procedure as in binary centroid. This gives 
a more consistent track point for the missile to guide by always centering the 
target in the center of the image. Imaging seekers provide resolution that is 
required to separate the target from expendable countermeasures. 
                  Intensity  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16   Centroid  
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0   6 72
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0   5 55
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0   7 70
9 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 5 3 3 4 5 2 0 0 0   31 279
8 0 0 1 5 4 10 13 13 12 8 8 6 4 1 0 0   85 680
7 0 0 5 4 4 5 6 7 9 8 6 0 0 0 0 0   54 378
6 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   14 84
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0
                                  202 1618
 0 0 6 11 10 19 27 29 26 20 18 20 15 1 0 0 202   
 0 0 18 44 50 114 189 232 234 200 198 240 195 14 0 0 1728   
 
 
Figure 11.   Centroid Image. 
xbar= 8.554455The area 
balance 
track point ybar= 8.009901
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Missile Name Phase of Flight Sensor 
Crotale TV(Regular+IR)+Command RF+IR 
Table 9.   A missile that employs imaging guidance. 
D. MISSILE TRAJECTORIES 
1. Pursuit 
The missile follows the target as long as the line of sight between missile 
and target is established. It ends up in a tail-chase situation. Therefore, the 
speed of the missile must be greater than that of the target. In the terminal 
phase, before ending up in a chase situation, the missile must be agile. There 
are two main reasons for this. First, due to the arrival angle of the missile, it must 
make a sharp turn to intercept. Second, the target will likely attempt to terminate 
the lock-on by maneuvering. These reasons make pursuit trajectory useful 
against slow-moving aircraft. Also, it is effective for tactical aircraft if the missile is 
launched from a point directly to the rear of the target or head-on toward an 
incoming target. Because, in this case, the approaching angle between the 
missile and target is 0 degrees, it enables the missile to go straight.  
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Figure 12.   Types of trajectories.7 
2. Lead Angle 
A lead trajectory is calculated based on the target’s flight path. If there is 
no bearing change in the flight path of the target, the trajectory of the missile will 
be a straight line. On the other hand, if the target’s path changes, then the 
missile recalculates the new bearing to fly toward. 
3. Three-Point 
Three-point trajectory is used only for short-range missiles using CLOS or 
beam-riding guidance. When the missile, tracking platform and target are thought 
of as points, they are always aligned to form a straight line.  
                                            
7 Ball, 394. 
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4. Proportional Navigation 
Sharp turns and continuous maneuvers cause the missile to lose speed 
and energy. Proportional navigation enables the missile to make small 
maneuvers at the beginning of the trajectory. Then, as the missile approaches 
the target, the proportional constant and the intercept angle increase, therefore 
minimizing the energy loss in the early stage of flight. The missile is always seen 
at a constant look angle from the target.8 
For the detection of a missile, the approach angle and the instantaneous 
image of the missile become more important. In electro-optics, the intensity of 
plume emissions varies with many factors, such as the angle of the missile 
relative to the receiver as well as the altitude and velocity of the missile.  
Pursuit guidance is not as effective as proportional navigation but it is 
simpler in mechanization developments. The missile velocity is important in 
pursuit guidance since the engagement always ends up in a tail-chase and the 
missile travels the longer distance. In the example shown in Figure 13, a non-
maneuvering target is hit by two missiles, one of which employs proportional 
navigation while other uses pursuit navigation. Pursuit navigation has a 
tremendous curvature. Therefore, it needs large acceleration and maneuvering, 
which reduces its kinetic energy and its range.  
 
 
                                            
8 Ball, 395. 
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Figure 13.   Pursuit vs. proportional navigation.9 
E. MISSILE FUZING 
A fuze detonates a high-explosive (HE) warhead when the missile is in the 
vicinity of the target or at the impact moment. The HE creates a blast wave and 
high-velocity metal fragments 
1. Time Fuzing 
This method initiates detonation after a preset elapsed time, which begins 
with the launch time. Missiles have limited fuel, which is one of the factors that 
defines their range. After burnout and losing its energy, it begins free-falling. 
Therefore, time fusing also enables the self-destruction of a missile when it 
misses the target, preventing possible collateral damage. 
2. Contact Fuzing (Hit-to-Kill) 
In contact fuzing, detonation occurs at the impact moment. For a more 
effective explosion, a short delay can be applied, which detonates the HE 
warhead after it is actually inside the aircraft.  
                                            
9 Paul Zarchan, Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance, 5th ed. (Reston, VA: American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2007), 772. 
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3. Proximity Fuzing 
With proximity fuzing, the HE warhead is detonated by a target detection 
device (TDD) when it is in the vicinity of the aircraft. The TDD can detect the 
proximity with either the missile’s system or its own.  
Warhead diameter and weights are important criteria for assessing the 




Figure 14.   SAM warheads and their diameters.10 
F. ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM AND SENSOR TYPES 
(DETECTORS) 
Sensors are the most important part of a missile. It is just like a sensation 
system in humans. If the sensor can be deceived, then the missile cannot reach 
                                            
10 Ball, 316. 
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its target. Different types of missiles use different sensor technologies but, for the 
time being, they all use the RF and/or electro-optical regions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, the technology behind the sensors is 
important since the counter missile actions must also take place in the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Figure 15 shows the wide range of the EM spectrum, 
from radio waves to gamma rays. Although there are no exact boundaries 
between the regions, commonly accepted regions are: 
Ultraviolet: 10 nanometers–0.4 micrometers 
Visible:    0.4–0.7 micrometers 
Infrared: 0.7–14 micrometers 
Frequency is used in the RF portion and wavelength is used in the optical 
portion of the spectrum. However, the speed of the light is a common formula in 
which they are related. 
c fλ= ⋅  
 
Figure 15.   Electromagnetic spectrum.11 
                                            
11 Electro Optical Industries Inc., “EM spectrum,” http://www.electro-
optical.com/html/bb_rad/emspect.asp (accessed 15 November 2007). 
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The electronic receivers of a guided missile can be deceived in three 
different ways: annihilating the target signature, obscuration and attenuation in 
the medium, and deceiving or destroying the sensor. As is illustrated in Figure 
16, a target produces or reflects signatures; the atmosphere enables those 
signals to be propagated and the seeker tracks those signals. The missile and 
the aircraft compete to prevail in this rivalry on the basis of three subjects in the 
EW spectrum and propagation techniques.  
 
 
Figure 16.   Missile-target engagement in the EM spectrum. 
1. Radar 
There are many effects that change the performance of radar, such as 
signal reception, receiver bandwidth, pulse shape, signal-to-noise ratio, receiver 
sensitivity, beamwidth, pulse repetition frequency, radar cross-section (RCS) of  





Figure 17.   Radar principle. 
The radar resolution cell is an important factor in break-lock calculations 
and in determining the resolution range when multiple aircraft are approaching. 
2. Electro-optics 
Electro-optics is a term that is used for a portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, namely wavelengths between 1 millimeter and 1 nanometer. This 
includes infrared, ultraviolet and the visible region. However, in the EW world, 
electro-optics is a term used for UV. 
a. Infrared 
All substances absorb and radiate IR energy, provided they are not 
at a temperature of absolute zero (0° K). The hot objects emit more energy and 
the peak wavelength of emission decreases as T-1. IR energy has the same 
features as visible light in terms of traveling in a straight line at 3x108 m/s and  
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being reflected or absorbed when hitting the surface of an object. Polished 




Figure 18.   Infrared principle changed from the original.12  
Just as in transparent materials, in which the visible light passes 
through, part of the IR energy striking a solid opaque material are absorbed, and 
some of them are reflected. Some of the energy absorbed by the material is 
converted to heat while some of them are reflected internally, as shown in Figure 
19. 
 
                                            
12 Ball, 359. 
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Figure 19.   Radiative heat exchange.13 
An ideal blackbody is a material that does not reflect or transmit 
any IR energy. It is an IR opaque and absorbs all radiant energy. 
Emissivity (ε) is related to a material or gas’ function of its 
molecular structure and surface and defined as the ratio of energy emitted by the 
material to energy emitted by a blackbody at the same temperature and shows 
the material's ability to absorb and radiate energy. The factors that affect 
emissivity of a material or gas are molecular structure, surface condition, and 
wavelength sensitivity of the sensor (sensor’s spectral response).14  
 
Figure 20.   Emissivity.15 
                                            
13 Omega Engineering, ”Infrared temperature measurement,” 




Highly polished surfaces reflect more IR energy but have much 
lower emissivity. 
Transmissivity is the ratio of incident light coming from a source to 
intensity (time averaged energy flux) or wavelength. It is the ratio of transmitted 
radiant power to the incident radiant power. Absorptivity is the ratio of absorbed 
radiant power to incident radiant power. Reflectivity is the ratio of reflected 
radiant power to the incident radiant power.16 
As we think about the concept of conservation of energy, the sum 
of the absorptivity, reflectivity and tranmissivity of a radiant power is equal to one.  
Thermal detectors can measure the differences in the physical 
features of the detector, which is caused by the heating effect of the incident 
radiation. They are slower to respond in that they do not have high data rates 
where it is needed, in searching and tracking. They are not extremely sensitive 
but they do not need cooling. 
Photon detectors have higher detectivity but they need cooling for 
optimum sensitivity. The optimum cooling is found for optimum wavelength 
coverage. The detectivity response of photon detectors changes with 
wavelength, which is shown in Figure 21. Photoconductors, photovoltaic 
detectors, charged coupled devices, and charge injection devices are types of 
photon detectors. 
 
                                            
16 Alfred Cooper, “EO-IR Countermeasure Systems Class Notes PH4209,” 2007. 
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Figure 21.   Detectivity plot of photon detectors.17 
The important formulas related to infrared are as follows:18  
1.  Kirchoff's Law. When an object is at thermal equilibrium, the 
amount of absorption will equal the amount of emission.  
2.  Stephan Boltzmann Law. The hotter an object becomes the more 
infrared energy it emits.  
4
totalP A Tσ ε= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
3.  Wien's Displacement Law. The wavelength at which the maximum 







λ μ=  
                                            
17 Cooper. 
18 Omega Engineering. 
 34
Figure 22 shows propagation of electromagnetic radiation in the 
atmosphere. As you can see, while visible light can penetrate Earth’s 
atmosphere and reach sea level, UV is the most absorbed. Therefore, it is very 




Figure 22.   Propagation of EM.19. 
b.  Ultraviolet 
The UV region starts from 10 nanometers to 0.4 micrometers. UV 
technology is used usually in warning systems to detect the missile plume. 
Because as it can be seen in Figure 22, background coming from the sun is 
blocked by the atmosphere. Reducing the signal processing provides a big 
advantage. 
                                            
19 Electro Optical Industries, Inc. 
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c.  Laser  
Laser (light amplification by the stimulated emission of radiation) 
can be used in different applications. An aircraft can be illuminated by a laser, 
which is used for range finding, target designation, target illumination, or beam-
riding. Different types of laser applications, pertinent laser types, and 
wavelengths are shown in Figure 23. 
Range measurement: The principle is the same as in radar. The 
time elapsed between the transmitting of a laser pulse and the return of the 
reflected echo is used for range calculation.  
Target illumination: A missile with a laser receiver can home onto a 
target illuminated by the laser.  
Guiding illumination: The missile follows the route as in the beam-
riding type. The receiver onboard the missile guides it and guarantees that it is 




Figure 23.   Laser spectral range.20 
Restrictions are atmospheric attenuation and low efficiency due to 
the characteristics of the laser. These restrictions mean that lasers are mostly 
used in short-range missiles (3–10 km).21 
3. Aural Detection 
In Figure 24, World War II air defense operators try to detect the target 
and its arrival direction. Sound has different properties than light. Since it has a 
very low propagation speed, it cannot meet today’s demand. But since large 
aircraft and helicopters travels at slower speeds, it can still be an effective 
method if acoustic sensors are placed on possible flight routes. Moreover, most 
                                            
20 Wikipedia contributors, “Laser spectral lines,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:laser_spectral_lines.svg (accessed 20 March 2008). 
21 Neri, 2001, 257. 
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of the time, it cannot be suppressed; from the missile perspective, it gives a good 
tracking signature if the delay problem due to propagation can be solved. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Acoustic tracking antenna.22 
4. Visual Detection 
The human eye is reliable for detection of threats. The contrast between 
the aircraft and the sky, or from smoke emissions and contrails, easily reveals an 
aircraft’s position. Contrails have different sources, such as aerodynamic, 
convection, and engine exhaust, which occurs at approximately 30,000 feet. 
G. EMERGING THREAT: MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
(MANPADS) 
IR seeker technology enabled the missile-independent, point-defense 
system. Their small size makes it cheaper as well as possible to rapidly change 
locations and create a threat anywhere. Therefore, they do not require anywhere 
near as complicated a system to use as in RF technology. For these reasons, 
                                            
22 Time-Life Video. Stealth, Great Fighting Jets, V648-01. 
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MANPADs have proliferated widely. While a missile costs around $30 thousand, 
it can shoot down a $30 million aircraft. Threat size, location, cost and effects 
combine to create an asymmetry between MANPADs and aircraft. MANPADs are 
threatening not only to military aircraft but also to civilian airliners. They are 
cheaper to buy and are easy to carry and operate. They employ the passive 
guidance method, using IR detectors. IR is effective over a short distance. 
An operator visually acquires the target and tracks it to enable the missile 
to lock-on using IR. The IR acquisition signal is electronically processed and is 
presented to the operator as either an audible or visible signal when the seeker 
acquires enough IR energy of the target.    
First-generation missiles have a peak detection sensitivity of 2 μm, which 
can detect a hot turbine from the rear aspect, in other words, an engine’s tail 
pipe. As the detector technology developed, the missiles gained more 
capabilities. The 1.9–2.9 μm band was used in first-generation missiles with 
limited capabilities, such as only tail-aspect target engagement. At that time, 
cooling was the problem. After the cooling problems were solved, operating 
bands shifted through the mid-IR region of 3.0–5.0 μm, which enabled attacking 
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Table 10.   Generations of IR missiles. 
Different types of missile seekers are spin scan, conical scan (conscan), 
rosette, focal plane array, and quadrant detector seekers. 
Spin scan: a reticle spins on the telescope of a spinning gyro and the blur 
image of the target produces signals as it goes through slots of the reticle. The 
disadvantage is that when the image is on boresight, the signal becomes 
insufficient and when the image is in center, there can be more noise. 
Conscan: a target image reflected by a mirror, which spins with a gyro, 
passes through a stationary circularly symmetrical reticle and produces 
modulated signals. It has zero tracking error compared to a spin-scan seeker. 
Rosette Scan Seeker: a detector scans a small instantaneous field of view 
(IFOV) at a time, in a pattern that makes many loops to cover the whole field of 
view (FOV). It has the advantage of resolving multiple sources in the field of 
view. 
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Focal Plane Array Seeker: multiple-element detectors make a scan of the 
target. Image tracking is possible by centroid or intensity weight of the FOV. Just 
as in television, a target has an area shown by pixels. When the pixels’ positions 
are calculated with the intensity information, the target can be easily tracked. It 
has a better resolution than the reticle-type seekers and it may reject flares or IR 
decoys.  
Quadrant detector seeker: a target image is detected by four detectors. 
The signal is proportional to the area of the target that is detected by one of the 





ID Sensor Range: H / 
V (km) 
Speed (m/s) Guidance & 
Warhead 
Stinger USA FIM-92 
A/B/C/D 
2 Mid-IR & UV 
cooled InSb 
8.0 / 3.8 729 Passive Homing 
& 450 g HE 
GIMLET Russia SA-16 2 Mid-IR & UV 
cooled InSb 
5.0 / 3.5 662 Passive Homing 
& 390 g TNT 
GRAIL Russia SA-7A Mid-IR 
Uncooled PbS
5.5 / 4.5 580 Passive Homing 
& 370 g HE 
GROUSE 
Russia 
SA-18 Mid-IR - 
cooled InSb & 
uncooled PbS 
6.0 / 3.5 662 Passive Homing 
& 390 g TNT 
GREMLINRussia SA-14 Mid-IR Cooled 
PbS 
4.1/-- 470 Passive Homing 
& 390 g TNT 
Table 11.   Leading MANPADs.23 
Figure 25 shows some of the arguments that the missile must discriminate 
in real life.  
 
                                            
23 James G. Sliney, “Ground-based Laser/Optical Countermeasures-MANPADs,” 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/10454/33180/01563487.pdf, International Institute of Electrical 
Engineering (IIIE), 2005, (accessed 12 December 2007). 
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Figure 25.   Stinger and environment.24 
                                            
24 Global Security, ”Firing the Stinger,” 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/44-18-1/Ch3.htm (accessed 20 March 
2008). 
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III. SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF LARGE AIRCRAFT 
Important attributes of large aircraft include carrying large payloads for 
different kinds of missions, operating in all weather conditions, multi-mission 
capable, slow, redundant parts, not very maneuverable, and huge amounts of 
fuel onboard. 
A. LARGE BODY AND NUMBER OF ENGINES 
Aircraft produce signatures by reflecting signals or emitting noise and 
heat. The main sources of the RF and IR signatures are the large body and the 
number of engines. It is not practical to reduce the aircraft size or engines even 
though they cause the visual, acoustic, RF and IR signatures. 
1. RCS Prediction and Aircraft Identification 
The radar cross-section (RCS) of the target is the area that reflects the 
radar signals at a particular aspect and it is a function of:  
• the target’s geometry, reflectivity and directivity 
• the radar’s position relative to the target 
• the frequency of the radar 
• the polarization of the antenna 
• σ = Projected cross section x Reflectivity x Directivity 
• 4 sP
Pi
σ π=  
• Ps =Power per unit solid angle reflected by the target ( W Wsr = ). 
• Pi =Power density or intensity reaching the target ( 2Wm ). 
The RCS of a typical large aircraft is as shown in Figure 26. The RCS can 
reveal the vulnerabilities of aircraft at different frequencies. The radar range 
profile is a one-dimensional representation of an aircraft, obtained by the radar at 
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a particular aspect of the aircraft. These measurements are used for classifying 
the aircraft. In Figure 26, the radar returns from the scatters of an aircraft are 
projected on a one-dimensional line-of-sight representation. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Example of a range profile of Boeing 737-500.25 
In Figures 27 and 28, it is shown that a large aircraft’s nose-on aspect can 
extend due to airborne radar and the reflections from the jet engines and their 
intake ducts. The compressor blades in jet engines, or propellers on propeller-
driven aircraft, modulate the echo. When the radar antenna in the nose points in 
the direction of the viewing radar, the cross section can be larger.26 
 
                                            
25 Portegies Zwart, “Aircraft recognition from features extracted from measured and 
simulated radar range profiles,” 
http://www.science.uva.nl/research/ias/alumni/ph.d.theses/theses/JorisPortegiesZwart.pdf, 2003, 
(accessed 20 March 2008).  
26 Merrill Skolnik, Introduction to Radar Systems. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001, 58. 
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Figure 27.   Measured backscatter (RCS) from a 1/15th scale model 
Boeing737.27  
 
Figure 28.   Radar principle. 
 
 
                                            
27 Curtis Schleher, Electronic Warfare in the Information Age, 511. 
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A small RCS contributes to the jamming effectiveness of a self-defense 
system. If the aircraft has a smaller RCS, then it needs less power to jam the 
radar. Moreover, the radar sensitivity should need to be increased to detect the 
same target.  
P2-P1 = -39+10log(RCS)+20logF 
2. IR Signature 
The components of the infrared signature are shown in Figure 29. Sunlight 
is reflected and some of it is absorbed and reemitted by the airframe (skin 
emission). The exhaust plume expands, then becomes smaller and cools behind 
the aircraft; it also heats some parts of the airframe. Hot vents as well as landing 
and operating lights are also IR sources. The plume of the engine becomes 
cooler further away from the engine, and it makes a larger wavelength as the 





λ μ=  
 
 
Figure 29.   Components of IR signature.28 
                                            
28 Ball, 471. 
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The large IR signature produced by the engines enables missiles to 




Figure 30.   Nose aspect IR imagery.29 
Multiple engines have the disadvantage of revealing more IR sources and, 
even while jamming, they can be acquired by missiles. With a narrow field of 
view, a missile can capture several targets on a large aircraft. When a missile is 
jammed and diverted from its target, it should not reacquire another engine. 
Therefore, disruption can be a solution but the best one is destroying the 
missile’s sensor.  
Variations of an aircraft’s spectral aspect angle are shown in Figure 31. 
From the tail aspect, tailpipe radiation is high. As the azimuth angle goes from 
180° (tail) to 0° (nose), tailpipe radiation is obscured by the airframe and 
aerodynamic heating air intake ducts caused by the ram effect blunt surfaces and 
stagnation in the airflow over the airframe, becoming a more important factor 
contributing to the aircraft’s signature.30   
 
                                            
29 Gregory Czamecki, “Large aircraft vulnerability to MANPADs,” Aircraft Survivability 




Figure 31.   Variations of aircraft spectral signatures over aspect angle.31 
Typical plume emissions are 3–5 micrometers and skin emissions are 8–
12 micrometers. 
The lethal footprint changes according to the IR performance of a missile. 
 
                                            
31 Accetta and Shumaker, 1993, 165. 
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Figure 32.   Lethal footprint for IR missile.32 
The IR signature of a transportation aircraft engine can be calculated as 
follows. 
If we assume the tailpipe has an effective emissivity of 0.9 and an exhaust 
temperature of 500°C, the radiance is: 
4 12 4
2




−Τ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ += = = ⋅  
The radiant intensity of a single engine which has an exhaust radius of 20 
cm is: 
21.822 ( 20 ) 2289.6engine
WJ N A
sr
π= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ =
 
If the aircraft is at a distance where the individual engines cannot be 
resolved by the sensors, (in other words, if they are in the field of view of the 
infrared sensor) the radiant intensity of the aircraft becomes multiplied by the 
number of engines. 
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26.6% of the radiant flux lies in the 3.2–4.8 μm region, so for the same 
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Intensity(Wsr-1) 
Aircraft Type  2-3μm  3-5 μm 
Rotary wing       10-100       100-300 
Fixed wing(propeller)       20-200       200-500 
Jet fighter    50-1,000   100-10,000 
Jet transport  100-1,000     100-5,000 
Table 12.    Typical signature levels.33 
Aerodynamic heating does not produce significant radiant emittance. 
( ) ( )2 20T T 1 0.164 M 250 1 0.164 (0.4) 256.56K= + ⋅ = + ⋅ =  
4 0.0221W Wε σ= ⋅ ⋅Τ =  
3. Aural Signature 
The main source of noise in an aircraft is its engines. Turbojet engines 
generate low-frequency noise and can be aurally detected. High-frequency 
compressor noise makes little contribution to the noise signature.  Turbojet 
engines suck in air, accelerate it and pressurize it, then push it back, producing 
                                            
33 Accetta and Shumaker, 1993, 297. 
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great thrust, with noise. Another source of noise is airflow separation, which 
causes turbulence and noise in the engine. The engine nozzle is also a source of 
noise emission. Finally, as the aircraft flies through the air, the surface of the 
aircraft creates noise.  
4. Laser 
Laser illumination on the aircraft can be either direct or indirect (scattered) 
radiation. The divergence of the laser beam is smaller than other types of 
propagated waves. Therefore, it illuminates a small area on the aircraft. As the 
aircraft size becomes larger, the number of laser warning receiver sensors must 
be increased.  
B. FLIGHT PROFILES 
Large aircraft usually fly above 15,000 feet, which means they are usually 
free from the MANPAD threat. A typical flight consists of three parts: takeoff and 
climb, en route, and descent and landing. 
The typical flight path of a large aircraft is shown in Figure 33. Different 
kinds of SAMs threaten the different phases of flight. Vulnerabilities change 
according to the mission types and components.  
 
Figure 33.   Flight phases and threats. 
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C. MISSION DIFFERENCES 
Military aircraft operate in a highly threatened environment. When the 
mission dictates, they operate at less than 15,000 feet for airborne delivery, 
search and rescue, and special operations. Those missions might be over hilly 
terrain, desert, or dense vegetation and in all weather conditions, such as sunny, 
snowy, or rainy. Large military aircraft, such as tankers, transports, bombers, and 
AWACS, are strategic air power assets. Each of them accomplishes its mission 
in or near hostile fire. Although these large aircraft have redundant systems for 
emergencies, it is the tons of fuel and the size of the fuel tanks onboard which 
makes them most vulnerable.  
 
 
Figure 34.   Missile in chase.34 
                                            
34 Rick Raesly, Defensive Systems Capability Requirements, 2007. 
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IV. DETECTION OF THREATS (WARNING SYSTEMS) 
The best countermeasure is to avoid the threat. To avoid the threat, it 
must be detected. Warning systems help the aircrew to take effective evasive 
action and to use countermeasures against threats. In order to do so, they must 
be provided with accurate and timely threat data.   
 
 
Figure 35.   Threat avoidance. 
Threat avoidance can be supplied by two means. First, off-board data 
might come from intelligence and reconnaissance means, such as satellite data 
or signals intelligence (SIGINT), which can include electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
and communications intelligence (COMINT). But these may not reflect the real-
time situation with off-board means. Second, data from onboard radar warning 
receivers (RWRs) are used to complete the mission safely. RWR is limited to the 
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RF portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Therefore, if the missile employs an 
IR seeker, then RWR is unable to detect it. The flying platform needs a suite or 
combination of sensor systems. The suite should create a continuously updated 
electronic order of battle and evaluation of threats. If a missile is fired, then the 
aircrew needs to know a missile is launched and from what direction.  
Detection range is the range between aircraft and missile at time of launch 
of the missile and it is an important factor to initiate the countermeasures. The 
required minimum detection range is related to 
• minimum warning time  
• the speed of aircraft 
• the speed of the missile 
• the direction of attack 
For example, a C-130 or C-160 operating at Mach 0.4 (240 knots) 
engaged by a Mach 2 missile has a closure rate of Mach 2.4 for head-on and 
Mach 1.6 tail. It must have a detection range of at least 2 nm for head-on and 
1.33 nm for a tail engagement if a minimum of 5 seconds warning time is 
required to initiate the countermeasures effectively. Increasing the missile speed 
increases the closure rate, so it requires increasing the detection range. 
Spatial coverage should be as in Figure 36. There should not be blind 
sectors. However, possible blind spots are the sides of aircraft, which are far 
away from antenna’s boresight. 
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Figure 36.   Spatial coverage of warning systems. 
False alarms are one of the biggest problems with warning systems. If the 
countermeasure system employs flares or other one-time usable expendables, 
false alarms may diminish their already limited number. Moreover, by initiating 
expendable countermeasures, such as flares, the enemy can become aware of 
an aircraft’s presence visually. Therefore, the aircraft’s susceptibility increases.  
Reducing the false alarm rates is the solution, which can be accomplished 
by increasing the threshold level. However, using this method lowers false 
alarms at the expense of missed detections. The probability of detection is 
increased by incrementally reducing the threshold level; on the other hand, it 
increases the false alarm rate. Determining an optimum threshold level is an 
ongoing challenge. In Figure 37, the classification of threat warning systems is 




Figure 37.   Threat warning systems. 
 A. RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (RWR) 
1. General System Principle 
In order to have advance notice of a missile attack or even to detect the 
presence of a radar, the aircraft may carry RWRs. The pilot can take evasive 
action to defeat the threat based on RWR indications. 
An RWR is a receiver designed to monitor the RF environment 
continuously and alert crews about a radar threat to an aircraft. There are 
millions of signals in today's world. However, RWRs basically intercept the 
mainlobe radiations of radars. Mainlobe detection means the RWR will detect 
systems that are pointing at the aircraft and not indications from sidelobes when 
the radar is looking somewhere else. RWRs have very capable signal-processing 
devices in order to identify the threat signal among the high-density signal 
environment. When it receives a signal, it compares the signal with its large 
 57
database of threat features, such as pulsewidth, frequency, and pulse repetition 
interval. If the signals match, then the RWR gives a visual, audio, or both, 
warning according to that threat type. As the crew is aware of the threat, 
they take precautions to defeat the threat. It is vital to keep the threat libraries 
updated and accurate for identification emitters and weapon systems because, 
when a new weapon is developed, it has its own characteristics. If the data are 
not in the threat library, it cannot be matched; therefore, it appears as an 
unknown threat. 
The basic duty of an RWR is to find the range, bearing, and identity of any 
radar that illuminates the aircraft with the mainlobe. The pulse train is examined 
to find that information. The first step is interleaving, which means to separate the 
pulse train received from a specific radar from the others. The second step is to 
predict the radar type by using some parameters like pulsewidth, pulse repetition 
frequency (PRF), and frequency band to differentiate one type of radar from 
others. The third step is to find the direction of arrival by forming an amplitude 
monopulse measurement using two adjacent quadrant antennas.  
In Figure 38, the circles represent each of the four RWR antennas’ 
patterns. On the right upper side there is a threat pulsed radar. As the main 
beam rotates, it will only be received by Antenna #1 and Antenna #2. By 
comparing the amplitude of the received signals, the angle of arrival can be 
obtained. Since RWRs do not have very sensitive receivers, they only receive the 
main beam of the threat. Once the RWR processor identifies the threat, then, by 
means of the effective radiated power (ERP) of the radar and one-way link 




Figure 38.   RWR antenna patterns. 
Saturation effects due to high-pulse signal densities negatively affect 
RWRs and their signal processors, because they increase the total processing 
time since each signal must be classified. A shadow time is a period of time in 
which an incident pulse is lost because the processing time of the receiver is 
greater than the interpulse arrival time. As the processing capability improves. 
the shadow time decreases. All RWRs have a shadow time in which they are 
susceptible to losing a signal. 
RWRs can detect the type, location and operation mode of the threat. 
Threat operating modes are search, tracking and launch. As indicated by the red 
area of Figure 39, typical RWRs cover the frequency range 0.5 to 40 gigahertz of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Typical missile guidance radars employ 8–12 
gigahertz, which means X bands, shown in blue in Figure 39.    
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Figure 39.   Typical RWR frequency35. 
2. RWR System Components 
RWR system components are the antenna, receiver, signal processor, 








                                            
35 EM Spectrum, Available from http://www.electro-optical.com/html/bb_rad/emspect.asp 
(accessed 14 February 2008).  
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Figure 40.   RWR System Components.36 
RWR antennas are symmetrically located and deflected 15° from the yaw 
axis to insure 360° coverage. The pitch angle is +1/2° to -45°.  
                                            
36 David Adamy, EW 102: A Second Course in Electronic Warfare, Artech House Radar 




Figure 41.   Typical RWR antenna placement. 
The receivers include crystal video receivers to receive pulses over a wide 
frequency range. In modern RWRs, narrow-band receivers are also included to 
process CW and pulse-Doppler radar signals. 
3. Receiver and Sensitivity of RWR 
The lowest signal level that can be detected meaningfully by a receiver is 
called sensitivity. Before entering the firing range of a threat, an RWR must 
detect and warn the aircrew about the presence of a threat. Otherwise, it is 
probable that some hostile weapons might hit the target. In this regard, sensitivity 
is important. If the RWR is highly sensitive, it can detect low power signals at 
longer ranges.   
Sensitivity equals the sum of thermal noise in the receiver, noise figure, 
and signal-to-noise ratio. 
Sensitivity kTB NF SNR= + +  
kTB is the thermal noise in the receiver. 
6114 10log( )10
BWkTB dBm= − +  
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1BW τ=  
In an RWR’s case typical values are 




  Detection range of radar: 
Transmitted power= Pt =100kW = 80dBm 
Gain of transmitter=Gt=30dB 
Frequency=f=10 GHz 
Radar Cross Section=RCS=variable between 10-100 m2 
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Another formula, in dB form, to calculate the range is: 
40log(d)=-103+80dBm+2(30)dB-20log(10000)dB+10log(10)dB-(-96dBm)   
               =63dB 
d=37600meters 
An RWR can see the main beam of the threat radar when it is focused on 
the aircraft. Since threats can come from any direction, the RWR uses wide 
beamwidth to increase the probability of detection. RWR antennas also have 
wide frequency coverage. Therefore, these two limitations lead RWR design into 
low gain. RWR bandwidth must be wide enough to detect narrow pulse widths. 
Typical radar bandwidths are 4 GHz and RWR video bandwidth is 10–20 MHz.  
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Figure 42.   RWR antenna patterns.37 
2eff RF VIDBW B B= ⋅ ⋅  









Typical RWR antennas have 0-dBi peak gain at 10 GHz for any direction 
of arrival. 
Analog circuits have big error sources, such as limitations, calibration, and 
maintenance. However, digital signal processing-enabled stability means no 
errors caused by temperature differences, no need for frequent calibration, and 
easy integration with the computer systems and other onboard systems.  
4. Characteristics of RWRs and their Capabilities 
An RWR fingerprints a threat radar by frequency, pulsewidth, PRF 
patterns, missile guidance, scan pattern, power density, and angle of arrival 
(AOA). 
These fingerprints identify and locate the system that generates them. 
Threat radars have short pulsewidths. Threat radars also have some kind of scan 
method for auto tracking, particular scan resolution, and PRF patterns, like 
jittered, staggered, or a combination of them, which helps to resolve the 
                                            
37 Adamy, 2004, 53. 
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ambiguities. Generally, five of these fingerprints can resolve the range 
ambiguities. However, many threats have close to the same fingerprint sets. 
Therefore, an RWR uses additional parameters: transmitter power and 
beamwidth.  
An azimuth can be obtained from a direction-finding (DF) antenna and an 
approximate range can be determined from received power level. With this 
information, the proper symbols are displayed on the RWR: 
Due to the narrowing of the video bandwidth, the sensitivity of crystal 
video receivers is an order of -40 dBm for pulsed signals and -50 dBm for a CW 
signal. These RWRs are good against high-powered, low-repetition pulsed 
weapon systems and CW systems. However, RWRs have difficulties in sorting 
and grouping pulses, which are transmitted by high-repetition rate radars.  
Most RWRs cannot detect low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) radars, also 
known as “quiet” radars, because extraction of those signals from the noise 
requires digital processing. 
Modern RWRs, which utilize a digital receiver (DRX), have the advantage 
of digital processing in terms of reproducibility, stability, flexibility, and 
programmability of signals. Therefore, those new achievements led to detection 
of CW/ICW emitters, detection of LPI radar, and modulation on-pulse (MOP) 
analysis for identification and fingerprinting.38  
In conclusion, an RWR improves situational awareness and can detect the 





                                            
38 Neri, 2001, 324. 
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AN/ALR-69 (LORAL) 
Description: The RWR system detects, identifies, processes and displays airborne 
interceptor (AI), surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) 
weapon systems. 
Features The Advanced Crystal Video Receiver [ACVR] consist of radio frequency (RF) 
Triplexer, Extended Range Dual Log Video Amplifier (ERDLVA) and Logic 
Board. It will provide increased receiver sensitivity, increased dynamic range, 
and increased pulse density and signal processing capability. The ACVR will 
reduce maintenance costs through improved reliability and maintainability and 
enhanced Built-In-Test (BIT). 
AN/ALR-94 (BAE Systems) 
Features The AN/ALR-94 is a passive receiver system capable of detecting the radar 
signals in the environment. Composed of more than 30 antennae smoothly 
blended into the wings and fuselage, it is described by the former head of the 
F-22 program at Lockheed Martin as "the most technically complex piece of 
equipment on the aircraft." With greater range (250+ nm) than the radar, it 
enables the F-22 to limit its own radar emission, which might otherwise 
compromise its stealth. As the target approaches, AN/ALR-94 can cue the 
AN/APG-77 radar to keep track of its motion with a narrow beam, which can 
be as focused as 2° by 2° in azimuth and elevation. 
Table 13.   Some RWR types. 
B. MISSILE WARNING SYSTEMS 
RWRs are designed to detect hostile fire-control radars or missiles that 
employ active radar seekers onboard. An RWR is not enough to detect missile 
tracking. When a missile is fired, and does not employ RF energy for guidance, 
then the aircrew must rely on visual acquisition, which is extremely difficult.  
 
Figure 43.   Detection phases.39 
                                            
39 Raesly, 2007. 
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A missile warning system (MWS) can be either active or passive. Active 
warning systems transmit and receive reflected RF signals. Active missile 
approach warners have small CW or pulse-Doppler radars that are able to detect 
fast-approaching targets with a small RCS, which is probably a missile.40 The 
advantages of an active radar warning system are their long range, all-weather 
capability, and low false alarm rate. On the other hand, they are susceptible to 
being jammed. They reveal their own signature, which can be detected by other 
RWR platforms, and they can be targeted by an anti-radiation missile. 
Passive warning systems only monitor for either IR or UV signature. A 
passive MWS cannot detect a radar that is searching or tracking. Missile 
approach warners detect the launch or approach of a missile, providing that the 
UV or IR emission is within the FOV of the sensors of the warning systems. 
Passive warning systems, which have IR or UV sensors, can detect the 
threat's propulsion system. Basically, a UV sensor can detect the flame of a very 
hot booster rocket or afterburner; an IR sensor can detect a jet engine’s exhaust 
or a rocket plume. Longwave IR can even detect the hot leading edges of an 
aircraft or subsonic missiles. They can give very accurate angular data. But they 
are very dependent on atmospheric transmittance and are vulnerable to 
inclement weather. In the battlespace, fires, sun glint, lightning, gun flashes, and 
explosions can be a challenging problem for missile warning receivers, which are 
steady optical sources. They are more susceptible to false alarms and the range 
must be estimated based on signal strength. 
1. Radar-Based Active Missile Warning System 
This system is different from RWRs because it uses active radar to detect 
incoming threats. Radar’s capabilities are used for all-weather, accurate missile 
range estimates and impact times derived from those data. However, the 
transmitting signal also discloses the aircraft’s presence.  The very small RCS of 
                                            
40 Schleher, 451. 
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the missile and the multipath signal caused by the reflected signals from different 
obstacles make it hard to detect and sometimes produces false alarms. At low 
altitudes, strong ground clutter can be observed. Other problems can be antenna 
coverage and minimum closure rate.  Performance does not depend on weather. 
If a radar-based active missile warning system is employed, then there may be 
no need for an RWR. Some radar-based active missile warning systems are 
described in Table 14. 
 
AN/ALQ-156(V)  (BAE SYSTEMS) 
Description: Missile Warning System 
Features 360-degree pulse Doppler radar missile detector that illuminates an 
incoming missile, detects the RF reflection, and measures the missile’s 
range and velocity to accurately determine time-to-go and provide the 
optimum triggering of an expendable to protect the host platform. 
AN/ALQ-161 AIL Systems Inc. 




The Tail Warning Function provides a Pulsed Doppler radar function to 
detect any missile threatening the bomber from the aft sector. The 
system provides 360-degree receive and jamming coverage against a 
large number of simultaneous threats, 
 
Table 14.   Some radar-based active missile warning systems. 
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2. Passive Missile Warning Receivers 
In missile warning receivers, the detection range is always greater than 
the declaration range, which is the range at which the detected signal is 
classified as a threat. This is due to the processing time for deciding whether the 
detected target is a real threat or not. This interval for processing data is called 
latency time.41 For missile detection, the important criteria are observables, 
propagation, background and clutter, and signal detection. 
a. Ultraviolet Warning Systems 
An ultraviolet missile warning system employs UV-based detectors. 
UV-based missile approach warning systems are simpler and have short ranges. 
Their sensors are small and do not require cooling. They do not have visible 
moisture problems. In the atmosphere, the thick layer of ozone blocks solar UV 
radiation. Also, there are low natural background and clutter levels that can 
cause false alarms because solar-blind UV is the 250–280 nanometer band, 
where solar radiation is completely absorbed by the atmospheric ozone and 
enables a clear background for missile plume detection. The chemiluminescence 
between carbon monoxide (CO) and oxygen (O) is the dominant source of UV 
emission in the solar blind range, and scattering in this plume resolves the 
problem for head-on approach.  
On the other hand, they have higher altitude and urban pollution 
restrictions caused by ozone limitations. Ozone concentration in industrial areas 
reaches high values in summer (atmospheric scattering and absorption). UV’s 
short range is caused by the ozone, which absorbs the UV radiation of the target. 
Halogen lamps, fires, sparks, welders, etc., can cause false alarms. After the 
missile’s fuel is expended, it cannot be tracked by UV due to lack of signature. In 
general, UV systems have been widely used for platforms that fly slow and at low 
altitude. 
                                            
41 Accetta and Shumaker, 1993, 16. 
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They are low in cost due to their simplicity and they have minimal 
background clutter problems. It is a mature technology. 
High-thrust propellants can be detected easily since they emit 
strong UV, but low-visibility propellants for the missiles and post-burnout 
detection are insufficient aspects of UV-based warning systems. 
Some passive missile warning systems are described in Table 15. 
AN /AAR -54(V)   (Northrop Grumman ) 
Description: Passively detects UV energy from the missile’s exhaust plume, track multiple sources, 





Features A unique optical design, incorporating state-of-the-art filter technology, with purpose-
built image-intensifier tubes and photon-counting focal-plane array processors ensures 
high sensitivity, which equates to long detection range. Each sensor is served by a 
dedicated high performance digital signal processor, making use of highly pipelined 
command execution and parallel processing. 
 
SBUV Detects the UV radiation of the approaching missile and hands over its coordinates to 
the fine-tracker and jamming system.  
 
Table 15.   Some passive missile warning systems. 
In Figure 44, a mortar launch test demonstrated the use of UV-
based detectors. The biggest signature is the launch of a missile. 
 
Figure 44.   Images over time during launch.42 
b. IR-Based Warning Systems 
A missile plume has a much higher IR signature than UV signature 
because the IR content of the missile plume is larger. In the IR band (3–5 
                                            
42 SBUV, “Missile Approach Warning Sensor,” 
http://www.sbuv.com/MissileWarning/index.html (accessed 20 March 2008). 
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micrometers) the atmospheric absorption is less than in the UV band. IR-based 
warning systems are more complex, but they have greater range capability. They 
can detect plume emissions and hot aircraft parts as well. They have the 
potential for post-burnout tracking. However, they have visible moisture 
limitations.  
Numerous other IR sources in this band can increase the false 
alarm rate. Sophisticated processing is required to remove clutter. To decrease 
the need for discriminative processing, two-color or multi-color detectors are 
developed. The biggest problem with IR detectors is the need for cooling to 
reduce thermal noise. The cooling devices make the systems more likely to 
malfunction and make the system bulky, vulnerable, costly, and weighty.  
Signatures IR(W/sr) UV(mW/sr) Time(seconds) 
Boost 100 10 1.5 
Sustain 10 3 1.5-7.1 
PBO(post-burn-out) 0.1 0 7.1 
Table 16.   Example of a missile signature.43 
The characteristic emissions of today’s propulsion technology, 
listed above, will change in future-generation missiles, which will utilize new-
generation propellants to release fewer signatures. 
For a missile approach warning system, the observation angle is 
important. If the image has a steady perspective, then it becomes easier to 
detect. It is easier to detect a missile that employs a proportional guidance 
system since it is seen from a constant angle by the target. On the other hand, 
for the command line-of-sight schemes, it is difficult to detect a missile due to the 
fixed position along with the background clutter. 
                                            
43 Cooper. 
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C. LASER WARNING RECEIVERS 
Each laser type has its own properties, like wavelength, PRF or 
pulsewidth. Laser warning receivers (LWRs) have the same principles as crystal 
video RWR. It compromises receiving optics, optical filters, detector arrays, 
receiving systems, and output. Receiving optics collect the laser energy. The 
optical filters reject energy seen as non-laser or at all other wavelengths other 
than the interested wavelengths. The accepted laser radiation, which comes from 
the filter, is focused onto the detector or scanned across an array of detectors. 
The output consists of electrical signals and they show the modulation 
characteristic of the illuminating laser. But deriving the illuminating laser source is 
different than in RWRs. A laser beam illuminates a small area on the target. 
Laser radiation may be detected from reflections from the airframe or scatter 
from the atmosphere. Any directional information would have little relevance to 
the true detection of the laser. The atmosphere distorts the wavefront and 
introduces large errors in direction measurements. There are techniques for 
helping LWRs to overcome propagation and refraction problems. Four indirect 
detectors give a protected area of 1.6 m diameter and direct detector 360 +10 -
45 elevation.44 But they do not give a precise angle of arrival. There are 
examples of direct and indirect LWR sensors in Figure 45. 
 
                                            
44 J. P. R. Browne and M. T. Thurbon, Electronic Warfare, 1998 (Brassey’s Inc.: London; 
Washington), 221. 
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Direct LWR sensor Indirect LWR sensor 
Figure 45.   Direct and indirect LWR sensors.45 
As in Figure 46, a 2-D array of detectors can give precise AOA 
information. 
 
Figure 46.   2-D array detectors.46 
                                            
45 Browne and Thurbon, 220. 
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LWRs must cover the proper waveband and be able to identify the missile 
characteristics. The basic steps of LWR are detection of signal, discrimination of 
the real signal from false signals, characterization of the laser, and localization of 
the source.47 
Signal detection is related to the system’s sensitivity and is usually limited 
by solar shot noise and Johnson noise in the visible and near-IR regime and by 
detector/thermal noise in the mid- and far-infrared. If the receiver sensitivity is 
high, it can destroy the receiver or cause a saturation effect that results in 
incorrect signal characterization. 
 
False Alarm Problems MWR LWR 
Sun glint, lightning, gun 
flashes, explosions 
 Rejected by Coherent 
detection techniques 
Steady optical sources 
(battlespace fires) 
Still a problem Rejected by transient-
oriented circuitry or 
typical LWR 
White noise-generated   
 
Table 17.   False alarms. 
Characterization of a threat laser by an LWR can be accomplished roughly 
by measuring laser wavelength, intensity duration and PRF. Weapon lasers are 
at specific wavelengths and usually have long-duration pulses. Since LWRs work 
coherently with the laser countermeasure transmitters, they must acquire pulse 
repetition rate and /or pulse interval more accurately.48 
                                            
46 Browne and Thurbon, 220. 
47 Accetta and Shumaker, 16. 
48 Ibid., 17. 
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An LWR can localize the threat by first determining whether it is coming 
directly or not. If the photons of the incident beam are scattered by target or the 
atmosphere, these secondary scatter/reflection intercepts can cause misleading 
directional data and it is very difficult to extract the correct threat location. For an 
LWR, a few degrees may be adequate to localize the threat, as in RWR. 
However, for directional countermeasures, directional accuracy must be better, 
because effective jamming can be done with a solid angle, which illuminates the 
seeker. 
Laser wavelength is primarily determined by laser material with a variety 
of individual laser ‘lines’ possible from any individual material. Mostly, military 
lasers are continuous wave, long-pulse, or short-pulse multimode devices and 
they radiate an unpolarized beam.  
“The continuous wave lasers (example: gallium arsenide semiconductor 
lasers and CO2 gas lasers) are usually modulated at high rates and are used in 
applications such as communication or missile guidance, in which they can carry 
large amounts of information.”49 
1. Propagation 
Atmospheric scatter and atmospheric scintillation are major concerns. 
Throughout the visual and into the mid-IR spectral region, the dominant source of 
near-earth and low-altitude attenuation is the aerosol-scattering component. 
The laser beam may not directly strike the LWR and when it is not directly 
incident, it usually passes nearby. Therefore, detection of light scattered from the 
adjacent air is a major aspect of LWR design. 
Basically, there are two scatter sources: the adjacent atmosphere and the 
target platform. In order to view the scatter from a portion of one’s own platform, 
the LWR must be positioned properly.  
                                            
49 Accetta and Shumaker, 55. 
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2. Backgrounds and Clutter 
Potential false alarms may be caused by:50 
• Scene clutter resulting from steady-state solar reflectance and 
thermal self emission 
• Sun glint 
• Battlefield sources (gun flash, fires, etc.) 
• Lightning 
• Electromagnetic interference 
• Cosmic rays. 
Those false alarm sources can be eliminated by high coherency, pulse 
rise time, pulse energy, sensitivity characteristics of laser radiation. The typical 
LWR wavelength band is 0.5-1.6 μm.  
Some LWRs are described in Table 18. 
LWS 300 Saab 
Features The LWS provides threat classification and direction finding (DF) indication of laser 
rangefinders, designators and lasers used for missile guidance purposes and dazzler 
lasers. The system is designed to be stand-alone or to interface with an existing on-board 
RWR/ESM host-system via the EW Controller for data processing and interfacing to the 
host EW system. A priority interface to the countermeasures system is available for the 
activation of countermeasures. 
Broad coverage of the laser spectrum ensures detection of most known current threats. The 
sensitivities of the LWS-300 sensor  has been carefully chosen to provide warning of laser 
threats at ranges generally 1,5 times the threats engagement range. High sensitivity with 
optimised installation ensures the detection of lasers targeting any part of the platform. 
301-M Goodrich 
Description: The 301-M LWR detects, prioritizes in order of lethality, and characterizes Beamrider, 
Designator, and Rangefinder threats.  
AN/AVR-2  
Description: A passive laser warning system, which receives, processes and displays threat information 
resulting from aircraft illumination by lasers. 
Features: Provides advance warning of laser energy directed against the aircraft, including both laser 
range finders and laser guidance systems, enabling the aircrew to take evasive action. The 
Laser Detecting Set detects engagement by laser-aided weapons and delivers sufficient 
warning to the aircrew to allow evasive lifesaving action to be taken. Consisting of four 
sensor units and a central interface unit, the system detects, identifies, and characterizes 
laser-aided weapons 360 degrees around and +/- 45 degrees in elevation about the aircraft. 
Table 18.   Some LWRs. 
                                            
50 Accetta and Shumaker, 55. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
RF missiles have a greater target range than IR missiles, whose 
effectiveness is severely degraded by the atmosphere. But RF is a mature 
technology and is becoming more complex and expensive. Passive missile 
warning systems usually give the alarm when they sense the flash of the launch. 
UV sensors are more effective at low altitudes whereas IR sensors are effective 
at higher altitudes. UV radiation is usually man-made so it rarely occurs in nature. 
However, IR radiation is more frequent, which means that more time has to be 
spent distinguishing threats from clutter. A laser warning system warns that the 
aircraft has been illuminated by a range-finding or targeting laser. They have a 
limited range but are very effective and precise.  
The important thing is to be aware of the threat and from where it comes 
from. 
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V. THE METHODS OF COUNTERING 
There are three approaches to countering a SAM threat.  First, there are 
the actions taken by the targeted aircraft through maneuver or design.  The 
second is the atmospheric environment between the plane and the missile where 
expendables, towed decoys, and the physical characteristics of the environment 
interact. Finally, there is the missile itself. In Figure 47, each solution pertaining 
to that subject is shown. The target produces or reflects signatures; the 
atmosphere enables the propagation of those signals; and the seeker tracks 
those signals. In each column, possible solutions are shown.  
 
 
Figure 47.   Countering threats. 
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For three basic threats (RF, IR/UV, Laser) basic concepts are highlighted 
below. 
• Against RF 
• Target: The signal should be absorbed or reflected to other 
directions other than threat receiver. 
• Atmosphere: Deception. There should be some other 
materials, namely chaff, decoys, or towed decoys, to reflect 
the radar signals back so that the missile radar or radar track 
can establish on the wrong, fake, target. 
• Missile: Jamming the missile seeker or ground radar for 
tracking errors, blinding the missile’s antenna and electronic 
components, or destroying the electronic components of an 
RF missile by high-power microwave. 
• Against Infrared/Ultraviolet 
• Target: Reducing or suppressing the target’s signature or 
noise can be added. 
• Medium: Deploying decoys or flares. 
• Sensor: Jamming. Emitting high-power signals to a wide 
angle or narrow angle to the lenses or sensors of the missile. 
• Against Laser 
• Target: 
• Medium: Reflecting the laser in a different path by means of 
decoys in the laser’s path. 
• Sensor: Jamming. High-power signals may be directed into 
detector elements of laser receiver and seeker electronics. 
Basically, all countering systems use deceptive or destructive methods. 
The missile can proceed to the target unless there is no stronger IR or RF 
source, and no clutter in the field of view.  
In Figure 48, different solutions are shown to give a general view for 




Figure 48.   Countering threats. 
A. OFF-BOARD COUNTERMEASURES (EXPENDABLES) 
Expendables are countermeasures (CM) that are used to deceive the 
threat by deploying off-board things that are capable of reflecting signals, 
transmitting RF signals, or emitting an IR signature, according to the type of 
threat sensor. By imitating the target, they cause the missile to divert from its 
original target. They are relatively cheap and, like ammunition, they are limited 
onboard. Since there is a finite number available, when they are completely 
dispensed, the platform becomes unprotected. Most primitive expendables are of 
the free-fall type, which can be filtered out by velocity or Doppler effects. Before 
releasing the expendables, the important decision-making questions are, “When, 
how many, how often, which direction, and against what?” There are three kinds 
of off-board CM: free-fall, propelled, and towed decoy.  
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1. Passive Off-board CM 
a. Chaff 
Chaff is the oldest method of radar countermeasure. The chaff is 
made up of small strips that act like antennas, electromagnetic dipoles that re-
radiate the pulses of the radar passively. By using the least amount of material 
and a relatively high RCS, the dipoles are cut to the first resonance point. The 
gain depends on the angle. 
Length = λ0 / 2 
Chaff forms a cloud of very small dipoles, which creates 
backscatter in which to conceal targets. In the past, the chaff was laid for creating 
corridors to conceal attacking aircraft. Nowadays, the main purpose of chaff is for 
self-protection to break the radar lock-on function of a fire-control anti-aircraft gun 
or missile system. It is employed in the “end of game” scenario. The size of the 
chaff cloud should be several times larger than the radar return of the target 
aircraft.   
When entering a battlespace, there are different threats employing 
different frequencies. When a wide range of radar frequencies must be 
countered, the chaff is cut to a pattern of different lengths to optimally cover the 
necessary frequency ranges. The chaff cloud causes the radar to switch its 
tracking lock onto the cloud. 
In Figure 49, the resonance for a single dipole and three dipoles 
are shown. A single dipole is effective in 3 GHz and its resonant frequencies: 6, 
9, 12, 15, etc., GHz. When there are three different lengths of dipole, their 




Figure 49.   Backscatter from a single dipole and three dipoles.51 
When chaff is dispensed, its velocity decreases very rapidly due to 
drag. The chaff cloud, which consists of millions of dipoles, grows rapidly. The 
distribution of the chaff cloud is affected by the launching aircraft, dispenser 
design, and the position of the dispenser on the aircraft. The width difference, 
which causes weight differences among the dipoles, also affects the chaff cloud’s 
growth since the heavier dipoles fall faster than the lighter ones. The fall rate of 
the chaff varies from 0.1 to 1.0 meters/second depending on weather conditions.  
The maximum cloud size is gained when it is as large as 
mathematically possible. N is the number of dipoles in a chaff cloud. Λ0 is the 
wavelength of the threat radar. The theoretical RCS of a randomly oriented half-
wave dipole is: 
2
00.155dipoleRCS λ=  
2
max 00.155dipoleRCS N RCS N λ= ⋅ = ⋅  
                                            
51 Philip Pace, “Introduction to Joint Electronic Warfare Class Notes,” 2006. 
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Figure 50.   Chaff.52 
To protect a large aircraft, the cloud must be at least 300m2, and the threat could 
be X-band radar, which has a wavelength of 0.03m. Therefore, there must be at 
least 2,150,537 dipoles. 
Since each dipole is like a piece of hair, it takes several hundred 
million of them to build an effective chaff cloud. As the chaff cloud expands, its 
density decreases and the separation between the dipoles becomes larger.  
For an optimized usage of chaff, the important factors are: 
• Chaff type (aluminum-coated glass chaff are more commonly used) 
• Chaff length (chaff dipole cuts, resonance of half the wavelength). It 
should cover the threat radar’s wavelength. 
 
                                            




Figure 51.   Chaff Cloud. 
• Number of different chaff cuts in a cloud to counter multiple threats. 
The threat radar’s wavelength may be unknown beforehand; 
therefore, a number of different chaff cuts must be in the cloud to 
provide full coverage. 
• Burst intervals (in modern dispensing systems, 30–50 milliseconds) 
and an adequate ejection sequence 
• Dispersion duration to create shielding (sometimes referred to as 
blooming time, it is the time that it takes for the chaff cloud to reach 
its maximum backscattering area).  
• Location of the dispenser. For distribution purposes, they can be 
mounted on two different sides of the wings, enabling the airflow 
and engine exhaust to disperse them more efficiently.  
• The type of dispenser. 
• The type, size, and speed of the aircraft. 
• The type of threat radar. 
• The operating wavelength of the threat radar. 
• Weather (wind, rain, air turbulence, etc.) 
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• Birdnesting (poor chaff dispersal caused by adhesion between 
dipoles and entanglement due to lack of stiffness). A low incidence 
of birdnesting provides a more effective RCS and better distribution 
of dipoles.  
• Jackstrawing (poor chaff dispersal caused by the tangling of stiff 
dipoles even where no physical adhesion occurs).  
• Shielding (occurs when the dipole density prevents every dipole 
from receiving the full amount of radar energy). 
• Effective lasting time (lightweight makes the fall rate decrease, 
which enables a greater effective lasting time.  
An RWR gives a warning to initiate the launching of chaff at the 
right time. Then, before launching the chaff, the pilot should execute a maneuver 
to present a very low Doppler return to the threat radar. The chaff is launched 
and then the aircraft resume its course.  
For a typical short-range air defense missile with an engagement 
range of 7 km with an aircraft: 
Beamwidth=2° in azimuth and elevation 
Pulsewidth=range gate= 400 ns 
( ) tan( ) 244.4Beamwidth m beamwidth Range m= ⋅ =D  
60
2
cPulsewidth mτ⋅= =  
For an aircraft traveling at a speed of 250 knots (129m/s), it takes 
1.95 seconds to cross the radar resolution cell (251 meters) diagonally.  
One cloud of chaff is not enough to broaden and cover the radar 




Figure 52.   Self-protection.53 
Some radars ignore a chaff cloud because its velocity decreases 
rapidly. To defeat this problem, aircraft should dispense a series of chaff clouds, 
rapidly and in a sequence according to enemy radars’ capabilities. It produces 
the illusion that the cloud is traveling at nearly the same speed as the aircraft. 
The rapidly dispensed chaff clouds will ”walk” the radar behind and off the aircraft 
as in Figure 52. Chaff backscatter must become larger rapidly when in the same 
radar resolution cell with the aircraft in order to break lock-on. 
                                            
53 Aerospaceweb, “Missile Countermeasures,” 
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/electronics/q0191.shtml (accessed 20 March 2008). 
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Figure 53.   Chaff for self-protection. 
Chaff can be used to form a corridor to hide the aircraft for different 
missions. In Figure 54, an aircraft seeds the corridor and leaves the area, then 
the formation of aircraft can go forward without being seen by radar.  
 
Figure 54.   Chaff corridor. 
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b. Flares 
IR flares are used against IR-tracking threats. Flares are effective 
against early types of IR missiles, which utilize passive guidance and employ hot-
spot trackers. Spin scan and conscan seekers track more intense sources. 
Flares emit a high-intensity radiant, which lures the missile only for a few 
seconds. Therefore, it is important to dispense the flare at an appropriate time 
and direction to be effective. Missile approach warning systems warn the pilot to 
take evasive action against IR missiles. There are three ways to use flares: 
• Seduction: To disengage an actively tracking target. 
• Distraction: Used against threats before engagement or tracking. 
• Dilution: Target and decoy at the same time. 
To counter the missile seeker, a flare must rapidly produce two to 
five times the energy in the particular band that an aircraft produces.  
The flare and decoys have some properties that distinguish and 
discriminates one from another.54 These properties are used in improving 
missiles so that they will reject a flare by comparing the IR flare and the target 
signature: 
• Rapid rise time. While the flare or decoy is in the field of view of the 
seeker, in a very short time, it should produce an intensity sufficient 
to be tracked by the missile.  
• Sufficient energy output to ensure that the missile does not 
reacquire the target. 
• Peak intensity should be higher than that of the target to lure the 
missile away. 
• Spectral characteristics, which depend upon the burning 
characteristics of the fuel. 
• Sufficient function (or burn) time to allow the target to maneuver out 
of the field of view before the missile can reacquire the target. 
• Sufficient ejection velocity to assure separation from the aircraft. 
When the missile hits the decoy, its impact should not affect the 
aircraft.  
                                            
54 Accetta and Shumaker, 293. 
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• Aerodynamic characteristics. It is easier to reject decoys in free-fall. 
• Size. The flare should be big enough to counter imaging seekers. 
• Dispensing sequence and intervals. For optimal effects. 
 
 
Figure 55.   Flare and aircraft spectral radiant emittance.55 
Newer generation missiles employ imaging-type seekers that can 
discriminate the flare and reject it.  
 
Figure 56.   Signatures from a turboprop aircraft. 
                                            
55 Browne and Thurbon, 275. 
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Multi-spectral or multi-color sensors are another effective method of 
rejecting flares. A flare must burn at a higher temperature to produce more 
energy and its spectral radiant emittance is different. In other words, its emissivity 
will always differ from the actual target. Therefore, a missile’s seeker can rapidly 
discriminate among energy levels, temperature differences, shapes, and sizes 
and can just ignore those signatures for a period, generally 20 seconds. A 
sudden velocity decrease is another way to reject the flare. 
MANPADs have a short range and a short ceiling. Aircraft are 
usually at low altitudes when vulnerable to them. From the environmental 
approach, the use of a flare over a city or civilian locations presents a great 
chance of fire and related hazards on the ground since they are at low altitudes. 
Furthermore, it gives a great opportunity for the operator of the MANPAD to hide 
in such a place.  
 
 
Figure 57.   Flare.56 
                                            
56 Cooper. 
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In Figure 57, the cloud of smoke is a discrimination technique for 
missile detection. Therefore, the plume must be made smaller by increasing the 
size of the flare or increasing the capability of the chemical. 
A flare’s plume is produced by pyrotechnic reaction. Pyrotechnics 
provide sufficient peak energy intensity, a long shelf life, and are fairly cheap. 
Atomized magnesium powder and polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) resin are the 
most commonly used pyrotechnic compositions.57 
Imaging or quasi-imaging seekers can discriminate flares. New 
flare rejection techniques have been developed so there is a certain need for 
advanced flares. 
Another approach is to release these pyrophoric flares with a 
tactical air-launched decoy (TALD), seeding flares before aircraft enters a 
corridor.  Some flare types are: 
Standard Flare: MJU-7, MJU-10 
Spectral Flare: Tracor, Thiokol (2), Kilgore 
Aerodynamic Flare: Kilgore (2), NSWC Crane 
Special Flare: Alloy-SHS, Alloy-LTE  
2. Active Off-board CM 
a. Kinematic Special Material Decoy (IR Decoy)  
Since free-fall flares can be discriminated by velocity deceleration 
techniques, powered decoys, which can fly for a time, have been developed. 
Loralei (Lockheed Martin) makes use of this technique. 
                                            
57 Accetta and Shumaker, 299. 
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b. RF Decoy Systems 
Decoys receive a signal, modify it, and then retransmit the amplified 
signal. Therefore, they are different from chaff, which only reflect the signal. 
Decoys were developed when the home-on-jam types of threats increased. They 
are particularly effective against missiles employing monopulse and Doppler 
radars, which are difficult to counter by other means. 
There are basically three types of decoys: non-propelled, propelled 
and towed.  
Active decoys are produced by gallium arsenide (GaAs) monolithic 
microwave-integrated circuit technology. The battery time and shelf life are big 
problems. Therefore, to extend their effectiveness, they must be launched when 
the missile is approaching and at the right range. If that information is not known, 
then, at proper intervals, many decoys should be launched, starting when a CW 
emission illuminates the aircraft. 
Repeater towed decoys easily generate the CW jamming signal 
with the associated necessary Doppler frequency. 
Fiber-optic towed decoys are more advanced.  
POET Lockheed sanders 
Description: The first modern, active, expendable decoy. (Primed oscillator expendable 
transmitter) 
GEN-X Texas Instruments 
Description: Multi-threat, wide-frequency coverage, broad antenna pattern, modulation 
programmable, no aircraft mods, self-contained unit, thermal battery, 
operational life, 5-year shelf life. 
Features Digital RF memory(DRFM) 
TALD ADM-141A 
 Glider decoy 
MALD Miniature Air Launched Decoy 




Figure 58.   Typical decoy block diagram. 
c. RF Towed Decoy 
Towed decoys are effective against monopulse seekers 
(simultaneous lobing tracking), which have the advantages of getting an angle 
error estimate from a single pulse return, a short integration time, and are 
resistant to noise jamming. The cable should be longer than the missile's lethal 
radius. 
A decoy towed by an aircraft has some benefits. It travels at the 
same speed as the aircraft, it is powered from a different source, and it travels at 
a distance from the aircraft. Towed decoys produce signals much larger than the 
towing aircraft. Towed decoys are very effective against monopulse tracking 
radars and missiles, which reject angle deception.  
Noise jammers are countered by monopulse tracking radars. The 
monopulse tracking gives a strong home-on-jam capability. Moreover, onboard 
jamming techniques are very difficult to implement. Today, most ground defense 
systems have powerful Doppler filters. To deceive the threat, one must first be 
able to bypass the filter. A towed decoy transmits the jamming signal.  
Since towed decoys are small, if the missile approaching from 
behind misses the towed decoy and does not explode by proximity fuze, it will 
become a problem for the aircraft. Therefore, the pilot should know the missile’s 
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angle of arrival and maneuver so as not to give much jamming-to-signal ratio or 
introduce more RCS by banking. Whenever the towed decoy is hit, then a 
second one must be ready for the other possible threats.58 
 
Table 20.   Some examples of towed decoys. 
3. Ejection Methods of Expendables (Countermeasure 
Dispensing Systems)  
Dispensers are installed outboard to make use of good air flow. Today’s 
dispensers can have a combination of IR, RF expendables and decoys. Smart 
dispensers can run multiple dispense programs. Dispenser systems have a 
control unit, a sequencer, a programmer and a dispenser. The programmer 
controls the rate and type of expendables. Deployment methods can be 
mechanical, pyro, rocket, or mortar. 
 
 
                                            
58 Neri, 471. 
AN/ALE-50 Raytheon 
Description: 
Advanced Airborne Expendable Decoy (AAED) is a towed decoy that acts as a 
preferential target luring enemy radar-controlled missiles away by providing a 
much larger radarcross section than the aircraft. 
 





Fiber Optic Towed Decoy (FOTD) 
Features 
The AN/ALE-55 fiber-optic towed decoy and the AN/ALQ-214 radio frequency 
countermeasures (RFCM) are used together. The onboard portion of the RFCM 
system is designed to receive radar signals from potential threat emitters via 
antennas on the forward and aft sections of the aircraft and to generate an 
electronic countermeasures response to the threat. Jamming may use either 
onboard transmitting capabilities or the off-board transmitting capabilities of a 
towed decoy. For the off-board response, an effective jamming signal is 
generated by onboard RFCM equipment and provided to a decoy towed behind 
the aircraft for amplification and transmission. To reach the decoy, the signal is 
converted to light and transmitted down a fiber-optic link to the decoy. In the 
decoy, the light signal is converted back to RF, amplified, and transmitted using 
antennas integral to the decoy. 
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AN/ALE-47 Symetrics 
Features The AN/ALE-47 is capable of carrying a mix of expendable 
countermeasures including expendable jammers.  
 
 
AN/ALE-39 ALE-39 burst intervals are hardware limited 
-125 milliseconds for chaff 
-2 seconds for flares, 1 second intervals for jammers59 
Table 21.   Some examples of CM dispensing systems. 
B. ONBOARD COUNTERMEASURES 
There are several types of onboard countermeasures designed to protect 
the platform. The number of missiles to be engaged is one important evaluation 
of these systems.  
1. RF Jammers (Onboard RFCM) 
In today's battlespace, multiple threat attacks may occur simultaneously. 
Prioritizing those threats is an important task. Multiple repeater and multiple 
transponder RF generators can accomplish simultaneous countering. The  
 
 
                                            
59 “Advanced Technology Expendables and Dispenser Systems Program Review,” 6th, 
Monterey, CA, and (U.S.) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, 1996. 
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jammer must cover the full radar band (0.5 GHz to 18 GHz). Large aircraft have 
enough power and space for big systems but as the aircraft size increases, the 
RCS increases. This phenomenon requires more jamming power. 
/ 71 20 ( ) 10 ( )J SJ S ERP ERP Log d Log RCS= − + + −  
Onboard radar jammers have some inadequacies:  
• They cannot provide 360° angular coverage. They can have -+60 
degree angular fore-and-aft protection. 
• Frequency range cannot cover the whole band. 
• Processor is not capable of handling a number of pulsed and CW 
simultaneously. 
RWR must provide the jammer with:  
• The signature of threat 
• The precise threat location 
• Priority 
The burn-through range is the range at which the target’s jamming loses 
its effect on the radar and can be detected. It is the range at which there is no 
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AN/ALQ-162(V) Northrop Grumman 
 AN/ALQ-162(V) (also known as Shadowbox) is a single Weapon-Replaceable 
Assembly (WRA) that incorporates transmitter, receiver/processor, user data 
memory and an antenna module. It is a continuous wave, chopped repeater 
jammer that can operate autonomously or be interfaced with other onboard 
electronic warfare equipments. The system provides self-protection against 
radar threats by continuously scanning the threat signal environment, 
identifying emitters and then generating specific countermeasures against 
prioritized threats. The equipment's user data memory module is a single 
printed circuit assembly (with a programmable read-only memory) and 
provides a reprogrammable data bank for system control parameters, threat 
tables, threat priorities and modulation techniques. The antennas provide 
nominal coverage of ±60° in azimuth and ±30° in elevation.  
AN/ALQ-214 
 Lockheed Martin 
Description: 
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures(IDECM) RFCM 
Features 
The major hardware component to be developed by the IDECM program is the 
IDECM radio frequency countermeasures (RFCM) system and the ALE-55 
Fiber Optic Towed Decoy (FOTD), which is trailed behind the aircraft to 
optimize RFCM techniques against threat missiles and tracking/targeting 
systems. The RFCM consists of an on-board receiver/processor/techniques 
generator that stimulates the FOTD via fiber optic cable or on-board 
transmitters for transmission of the countermeasure technique. 
Table 22.   Some examples of jammers. 
Onboard jammers use either noise or deception jamming. 
a. Noise Jammers (Denial Jamming, Obscuration 
Jamming) 
Radars can detect a signal that is above the sensitivity level of its 
receiver, which is defined as the signal-to-noise ratio. If the noise is more than 
the signal, then the signal cannot be detected. A jammer must generate noise 
similar to the threat radar's thermal noise. Jammer characteristics:60 
• Spatial coverage 
• Frequency coverage 
• Receiver sensitivity 
• Dynamic range  
• Tuning precision 
• Noise bandwidth 
                                            
60 Neri, 381. 
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• Noise quality 
• ERP 
• Polarization 
Noise jammers are an early type of jammer. They obscure the radar screen. 
Direct noise amplification, which filters the original noise and directly amplifies it, 
is not popular today. 
White noise has a Gaussian distribution, and its spectrum is 
uniform. Some noise generating methods: 
• Traveling wave tube (TWT) type  
• Types of Noise: 
• CW 
• Swept CW 
• Spot noise 
• Barrage noise 
• Gated noise 
• Smart (coherent) noise 
A jammer transmits noise at the same frequency or frequencies as 
the adversary radar. If that is in a particular band, then it is called spot jamming. 
If it transmits in a range of frequencies, then it is called barrage or broadband 












   Spot jamming 




Noise jamming is not effective against monopulse radars. However, 
a threat to jamming is home-on-jam (HOJ) missiles. Two aircraft can defeat HOJ 
by alternatively jamming (blinking), causing the missile to be confused as to 
where to go. 
b.  Deception Jammers 
Deception jammers provide the radar with erroneous information, 
i.e., false targets. They break tracking lock by pulling the radar off in range or 
angle. 
Deception jamming (repeater jamming) can be used against search 
and tracking radars. Deception jamming is more effective than noise jamming 
because modern radars implement coherent techniques. 
Deception jamming causes tracking radars to break angular tracks. 
Since tracking radars have narrow-angle beams, they lose the target, range and 
velocity information. It generally takes 10 or more seconds to reacquire. Different 
kinds of deceptive jamming are:61 
• Range gate pull-off 
• Inbound range gate pull-off 
• Cover pulses 
• Inverse gain 
• Automatic gain control (AGC) jamming 






                                            
61 Adamy, 2003, 50. 
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Coverage +/- 50az +/- 20 elevations 
 
AN/ALQ-122 (Motorola) 
Description: Multiple false target generator 
Table 23.   An example of a deception jammer. 
Digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) capability is needed 
against pulse Doppler radars. It receives the RF signals of a hostile radar and 
delays them by modulating and manipulating those signals it transmits. 
RF jammers on large aircraft are feasible since they can generate 
enough power. But they can be placed on only bombers or other high-value 
platforms. 
2. Active IRCM (Onboard IRCM) 
Active infrared countermeasures basically add modulated IR energy to the 
aircraft’s signature to jam the IR-guided missile. IR energy sources come to the 
detector and the signal processor determines the position of the target. The 
seeker tracks the highest radiant intensity. 
IR jamming causes an optical breaklock (loss of target tracking). An early 
breaklock is ideal but, due to long-distance attenuation of IR, it cannot be 
feasible. The important criterion is to gain a breaklock beyond the lethal range of 
the missile warhead. 
Active infrared countermeasures manipulate the infrared signature of an 
aircraft by adding modulated infrared energy to the infrared signature of an 
aircraft to deceive missiles. This procedure can cause to the seeker to lose the 
target completely and, in turn, affects the guidance function of the missile. In 
Figure 59, an IRCM jammer, is shown on a Boeing 747. 
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Figure 59.   IRCM on Boeing 747.62 
Arc lamps or graphite elements are used to transmit IR pulses received 
from the IR seeker's reticle with the aircraft’s signature. When both of them come 
together, they give wrong information to the missile. Large aircraft have large 
signatures. To defeat the missile, one needs more power to overcome this 
phenomenon.  
To saturate the signal processing in the missile, large jammer signals 
must be introduced to the missile’s seeker. 
Atmospheric attenuation, shielding, and other factors reduce the effective 
range for an IR missile to acquire the target. While IRCM can protect a C-130-
size aircraft, they cannot protect larger aircraft, such as C-17, C-5, and other 
similar aircraft, due to lack of jamming-to-signal ratio. 
Older versions of IRCM systems use wide-angle heat lamps, roughly 
similar to isotropic RF antennas, but these systems do not radiate enough energy 
                                            
62 Global Security, “AN/ALQ-204 Matador Infrared Countermeasure (IRCM),” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/an-alq-204.htm (accessed 20 
March 2008). 
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since they distribute the energy in a wide-angle direction and also alert the 
enemy of the presence of the aircraft. Thus, directed IRCM systems were 
developed.  
IR-tracking sensors are more susceptible to CM during the acquisition 
phase. 
a. Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) 
When the threat was only in the 1.9–2.9 μm band, the aircraft were 
threatened by only the hot parts in the aft portion; therefore, IRCM systems used 
a reflector to send the jamming radiation to the aft side of the aircraft. At that 
time, no missile launch warning was required because the radiation pattern was 
large. Therefore, they were not as complicated as today’s systems. 
After missiles began to use the 3.0–5.0 μm band and improved 
scanning systems (conscan and rosette), arc lamps and carbon rods became 
insufficient to divert the missile. IRCM radiates energy in all directions, like an 
isotropic antenna. Directional IRCM systems concentrate the energy onto the 
missile. Since it is directional, it needs less power because the power is radiated 
to a solid angle. However, in order to point directly on that threat in space, it is 
necessary to have information from the missile system that gives the presence 
and arrival angle of missile.  
A seeker can be illuminated by a large amount of radiation, causing 
damage to the detector, reticle, or filter, ending the threat because it is unable to 
track. A narrow-beam laser can be directed at the seeker for enough time to 
cause that damage. A reticle is easily damaged with less power, since it is a thin 
film. Dome damage requires an out-of-band high-power laser and this energy 
can be supplied by ground-based laser sources. 
DIRCM integrates missile warning and the IR jammer to counter 
first- and second-generation IR missile threats. DIRCM detects the missile launch 
with AAR-44 and/or AAR-54, then hands off MWS acquisition to a fine-track 
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sensor via DIRCM processor, acquires the target with the IR fine-track system, 
and defeats it. DIRCM are ineffective against missiles that use laser beam-riding 
guidance.  
 
AN/AAQ 24  (Northrop Grumman) Nemesis LAIRCM 
Features Next-generation integrated countermeasure system.  
AN/AAR-54(V) which is a 256x256 staring array fine  tracking subsystem 
detects missile’s plume and provides bearing data to  the AN/AAQ24(V). The 
turret of the DIRCM then swerves around and fires a laser beam at the seeker 
head of the missile. 
AN/ALQ204 BAE systems 
Features AN/ALQ204(Matador) consists of multiple transmitters each transmitter 
contains 4-12 kW source that emit pulsed infrared radiation. 
Table 24.   Some examples of DIRCM systems. 
b. LAIRCM Second Phase 
Today’s systems use open-loop IRCM lasers. They track via missile 
signature, generate a generic jam code by sweeping multiple threat frequencies, 
and confuse missiles with random false targets or IR energy. By degrading the 
guidance of the missile, it makes the missile wobble in flight but not necessarily 
break lock. The missile can then reacquire the target if the jam head moves to 
another missile. According to the predicted time of flight of the missile it jams, it 
then breaks off to switch to next threat after a few seconds. 
Pros: Continual protection 
Cons: Needs auxiliary power; size and weight 
A closed-loop IRCM laser tracks the missile whether active or 
passive. It has a higher power narrow-beam laser. It classifies incoming missiles, 
identifies their type, and predicts their time to impact. Then the highest priority 




missile to break lock and move sharply away from the target aircraft, allowing the 
engagement of another target after only 3–4 seconds. Therefore, it has a quick 
optical breaklock. 
Pros: Real-time classification of threats and positive tracking of 
missiles allow narrow-beam and higher S/J ratio. Optimal jamming enables the 
breaklock at a long distance.63 
None of the countermeasures is protective against all threats: 
• Noise jammers swamp the target signal with excessive signal. 
• Deception jammers cause the tracker to give erroneous data.  
• Destructive jammers destroy the sensor of the seeker by 
transmitting energy. 
3. Jamming and Chaff (JAFF) (Illuminated Chaff-CHILL) 
An onboard jammer illuminates the off-board dispensed chaff with either 
deception or noise signal. Therefore, the chaff can reflect two Doppler effects: 
one from the tracking radar and the other coming from the onboard jammer. For 
implementing this technique, antennas can be steerable according to information 
of the angle of arrival. This technique is used against coherent radars, which 
reject static targets.64 
4. Laser CM 
Laser CM are similar to rangefinders, having short duration and low 
repetition rates but with a higher intensity. The laser has a plasma spark effect in 
the seeker head close to the detectors. The energy from the plasma effect 
causes jamming and blinding effects. It may also cause some pits and scratches 
in optics, creates some debris, and negatively affects the electronics near the 
seeker.  
                                            
63 “Advanced Technology Expendables and Dispenser Systems Program Review,” 6th, 
Monterey, CA, and (U.S.) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, 1996. 
64 Neri, 452. 
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Figure 60.   Laser plasma. 
Lasers can cause thermal degradation/damage to detectors from a long 
(200 nsec) pulse effect. Plasma effects come from short (0.1–50 nsec) pulses. 
Optimum effects may require lasers at multiple, tunable, or broadband 
wavelengths.65 
5. Directed-Energy High-Power Microwaves (HPMs) 
Directed energy, as in radar and laser, has the advantage of the speed of 
light. Even for a missile, it takes an average of 7 seconds to hit the target but 
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High-power microwave energy disrupts or destroys missile circuits and 
drives missile away from aircraft. It is effective against IR, EO and RF missiles. 
Ultra-wide band sources eliminate the need for specific knowledge of threat 
missiles. Narrow-band effects are well documented. The effectiveness of HPM 
increases as the missile become more sophisticated because the increasing 
amount of electronics in the missile makes it more vulnerable to HPM.  
 
                                            
65 “Advanced Technology Expendables and Dispenser Systems Program Review,” 6th, 
Monterey, CA, and (U.S.) Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, 1996. 
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C. AIR VEHICLE SIGNATURE SUPPRESSION (SIGNATURE 
REDUCTION) 
1. RCS Reduction 
For reducing the RCS, vertical surface designs incorporate canting and  
swept leading edges. They should be designed to reflect the radar signals 
anywhere but back to the radar receiver. 
Figure 61 shows how this theory works. When we rotate the edge of the 
aircraft, the return decreases. 
 
 
Figure 61.   RCS reduction.66 
The engine inlet, engine, and exhaust are hidden above the wing. All other 
components around the aircraft are very important details. 
                                            
66 David Hall, David Andrews, Sangeon Chun, “Stealth,” 
http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:ag9apasC05IJ:www.aoe.vt.edu/~mason/Mason_f/Stealth
S03.pdf+stealth+david+hall&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 20 March 2008).  
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Radar absorbent materials, such as dielectric and magnetic, can be used 
to absorb the radar energy. 
To reduce reflections from the internal structure of the wing, leading edge 
construction should have a triangular shape.  
In Figure 62, the importance of RCS reduction is shown by presenting 
different kinds of aircrafts and their RCS.  
 
Figure 62.   Typical RCS values.67  
2. IR Signature Reduction 
Aircraft signature suppression devices shorten the acquisition range, 
enhance the performance of countermeasures, and reduce missile effectiveness 
from some aspects of attack. The concerns with the present suppressor systems 
are reliability, maintainability, loss of performance, cost, and interchangeability 
among aircraft types and engines.  
Important signature suppression methods are as follows.68 
                                            
67 Hall, Andrews, and Chun, 6. 
68 Accetta and Shumaker, 189. 
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a. Shape Tailoring 
Shape tailoring is directly concerned with RCS reduction (RCSR). 
In both RF and IR, the main concern is to reduce and eliminate reflections toward 
the seeker and receiver. RF threat sources usually have the transmitter and the 
receiver at the same location, i.e., monostatic. However, electro-optical sources 
are usually bistatic.  Therefore, passive bistatic sources constrain the shape 
options. 
b. Surface Appliqués 
Coating modifies the reflective, self-emission, and directional 
properties of the surface characteristics, and they give different results in the 
visible, IR, and RF spectral regions. 
c. Plume Suppression 
Engine size reduction requires tradeoffs among speed, payload, 
airframe, and plume suppression requirements. 
Cycle tailoring involves basic cycle configuration. Engine types are 
turbojet, turbofan, and turboprop. Due to needs in the aircraft missions, the cycle 
cannot be changed but they can be adapted for low observables. Higher bypass 
ratios supply greater air for exhaust cooling. In this case, the tradeoffs include 
cycle, mixer, nozzle, engine thrust fuel consumption, weight, and cost. 
Placing the airframe’s deck behind the exhaust obstructs the view 
of the nozzle and other hot parts as well as the plume. High-altitude aircraft use 
decks on the lower side of the engine; low-altitude aircraft use decks on their 
upper surfaces. 
The other signature suppression methods are obscuration, self-
illumination, active cooling, wake control, hot parts suppression, aircraft body 
signature suppression, and nozzle shaping. 
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3. Aural Signature Reduction 
Baffles and louvers can be placed in the engine where airflow separation 
occurs Laminate-coating reduces emission of noise in the engine nozzle and is 
also effective for IR signature reduction. The surface of the aircraft should be 
smoothed and streamlined, enabling little friction when flying in the airflow.  High-
bypass turbofan engines suck in a larger quantity of air and do not accelerate as 
much. Placing the engine on top of the plane hides IR and aural signatures. 
4. Visual Signature Reduction 
Camouflage, coating materials, light-diffusing paint, and glint-reducing 
paints have some positive effects, especially at night. More efficient burning in 
the engines reduces smoke emissions. Fuel additives can reduce convection and 
engine exhaust contrails. 
D. MANEUVERS AND PILOT TACTICS 
Pilots always try to visualize the big picture in their mind: who is the 
enemy? They should always have a backup plan. 
The best tactic is not to go where the threat is. However, if the mission 
dictates, then different tactics can be conducted by pilots according to altitude, 
speed, and environmental combinations restricted by aircraft maneuverability. 
1. Changing Routes Often 
Similar missions should not plan on using the same route. One F-117, 
which is a stealth aircraft, was lost in combat during the Kosovo War in 1999 
when the Serbians moved the radar system just under the reported flight path. 
Therefore, mission planners should also know the capabilities and possible 
deficiencies of their systems.  
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2. Agile Maneuvers 
Early SAMs employed IR sensors with very narrow fields of view. 
Therefore, when the aircraft turned sharply abeam of the threat (3–9 o’clock 
position) and dispersed chaff and flares, eventually the missile would lose sight 
of the target, breaking the lock. 
3. Speed is Life 
Another tactic is known as, “speed is life,” in which the aircraft accelerates 
and makes evasive maneuvers so that the missile’s limited fuel is expended 
before harming the aircraft.  
However, large aircraft are not so agile; they usually cannot exceed 4  
Gs of force and are unable to pass even Mach 1. Thus, these maneuvers are 
beyond the capabilities of most large aircraft. 
4. Corkscrew 
The most suitable tactic for large aircraft is the corkscrew. The corkscrew 
tactic involves climbing and descending in safe and protected places. After 
takeoff, the aircraft climbs in a spiraling or circling pattern and descends in a 
slow, tight circle, as if walking down a spiral staircase.  
5. Flying Low 
By flying low, the enemy has a minimum time for preparation, setup, and 
launch of the missile. If they do not have any other means of target detection, like 
integrated defense systems, which may give the information of target arrival, then 
flying low can be seen as a practical solution.  
As an example, for an aircraft flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet and a 
range of 6–8 km, a MANPAD can be set up and hit its target in less than 19 
seconds. For a MANPAD, visual detection and identification takes approximately 
5 seconds. Activation and gyro-slaving for an old type of MANPAD takes 4 
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seconds. The missile flyout takes 7 seconds, so the pilot has 19 seconds to 
defeat the threat.69 However, flying low is very risky because large aircraft have a 
large area vulnerable area to explosion when hit, namely, the fuel tanks along the 
wings.  
If the mission is flown below 15,000 feet, the pilot flies very low and very 
fast. Therefore, the operator of the MANPAD may not have enough reaction time. 
However, after losing some aircraft in Desert Storm, it is understood that flying 
low is not a proper solution. 
6. Fly in Cloud Tactics 
Flying in a cloud, which is filled with droplets or ice crystals, can be a 
solution against EO/IR missiles because EO wavelengths are strongly 
attenuated. Small rain droplets cause more attenuation than the bigger raindrops. 
Attenuation and EO transmission through the rain are affected by the size of 
raindrops, rain rate, and path length in the air. However, this cannot be a 
practical solution and, as can be understood from Figure 63, it is useless against 
RF.   
 
 
                                            
69 Mark Hewish and Juris Jannsen Lok, “Moderating MANPADs,” Jane’s International 
Defense Review, 1998, 53. 
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Figure 63.   Seeker performance in adverse weather.70 
7. Night Flying Tactics 
For countering terrorist attacks, arriving and departing at night hides the 
aircraft’s type and nationality. It disables visual tracking and acquisition by 
MANPADs. Lights-out approaches and takeoffs also contribute to the prevention 
of visual acquisition.  
Therefore, mission planning, which includes weather, terrain data, 
intelligence about enemy defense systems, and coordination with all operating 
friendly forces, is important.    
When an “air bridge” is established to a place, many troops and armored 
vehicles to support those troops are moved by large aircraft. If a SAM attack is 
executed against one of those aircraft, then the air bridge connection becomes 
damaged and the ground forces will have problems accomplishing their mission. 
Therefore, it affects the whole operation. 
                                            
70 Eugene L. Fleeman, Tactical Missile Design, AIAA education series, 2nd ed. Reston, VA: 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2006, 132. 
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Turning off radars, lights, and all IR- or RF-emitting systems also 
contributes to signature reduction.  
If the aircraft has no detection system, then the expendables can be 
dispersed on a contingency basis, according to intelligence data. Since the flares 
are very bright and have smoky trails, they release a visual warning to missile 
operators. 
Therefore, the aircrew of large aircraft is limited in what it can do against 
SAMs.   
E. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Helicopters and ground forces can be used for airport perimeter security 
as an active search for any attack elements. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or 
balloons with cameras can passively track suspicious activities around the 
airport. The MANPAD threat and the cost of self-protection of each aircraft has 
urged aviation companies to find other solutions.  
1. Ground-based Solutions  
Protecting a large military aircraft is essential to operating in a dangerous 
environment. However, protecting each aircraft with self-defense systems is not 
feasible in commercial aviation since it is very expensive. For civilian airliners, 
the threat is concentrated on terrorist attacks carried out by MANPADs during the 
takeoff and landing phases of flight. Typical flight times range from 2 to 13 hours, 
and susceptibility to MANPADs occurs primarily during takeoff and landing, which 
is only 30 minutes of that time. Therefore, it is possible to protect the aircraft by 
means of ground-based facilities, which can be easier, less expensive, and less 
burdensome on the airlines in terms of the costs of extra weight, volume power, 
maintenance, modification, upgrade, and interference problems onboard.  
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Ground-based CM use the same principles and technology as airborne 
CM. However, these systems must cover a larger area. They have some 
advantages. Since they are in a fixed position, the background does not change 
so rapidly, which makes signal processing easier. Different warning systems 
fixed in different positions around the airport gives the opportunity of precise 
threat detection by triangulation; therefore, the false alarm rates decrease. 
When the sensors hand off the threat information to target acquisition and 
tracking systems, the optical pointer tracker directs a laser beam onto the 
missile. The warning sensors and countering systems must be placed in a high 
position to be effective and cover all areas. 
A typical approach and departure takes 10 nm from the end of each 
runway. Typical climb rates are 2000 feet per minute. An aircraft can climb 6000 
feet by the time the aircraft reaches the boundaries of the threat zone. If the 
aircraft cannot climb to 15,000 feet upon reaching the boundaries of the 
protected area, then it should maneuver to climb at least 15,000 feet within this 
protection. The boundaries of the protected zone cannot be enlarged much due 
to the electromagnetic propagation capabilities of the countermeasures. 
 
 
Figure 64.   Protected zone. 
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Aircraft equipped with onboard CM must deal with the rapidly changing 
environment and complex background clutter problems caused by the speed and 
position of the aircraft. Ground-based systems are fixed or change their positions 
relatively slowly, so all background data can be saved and it is easier to find the 
changes caused, in this case, by a missile launch.  
Ground-based countermeasures can employ as many sensors as they 
need. Multiple sensors enable triangulation not only to find the location of the 
missile accurately, but also to detect simultaneous missile attacks.  
 
 
Figure 65.    Vigilant Eagle system.71 
Vigilant Eagle Raytheon Company 
Description: When located at a commercial airport, Vigilant Eagle creates a dome of 
protection around the airport by illuminating the missile body with 
electromagnetic energy tailored to divert the missile. This system uses 
directed energy in the form of pulsed microwave to interfere with the guidance 
of SAM . 
Features Vigilant Eagle consists of three major components: a distributed missile detect 
and track subsystem (MDT), a command and control (C2) system and the 
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), which consists of a billboard-size 
array of highly efficient antennas linked to solid-state amplifiers. The MDT is a 
fixed grid of passive infrared (IR) cameras that communicate with the C2. 
These IR cameras can be mounted to existing infrastructure to cover the 
required detection space. Each missile detection is confirmed by at least two 
sensors in an overlapping grid. This yields an extremely low false-alarm rate, 
demonstrated to be on the order of one or two events per year, thus 
minimizing impact on airport operations.  
                                            
71 Raytheon, “Vigilant Eagle,” http://www.raytheon.com/products/vigilanteagle/ (accessed 20 
March 2008).  
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Vigilant Eagle Raytheon Company 
The prototype high-power microwave (HPM) weapon, with its energy focused 
within 1 deg., sends an electrical pulse through the enemy missile’s metal 
parts and into its computers and guidance system. For a split second, that 
spike is strong enough to damage electrical components and scramble 
computer memories so badly that the missile flies off course and ignores the 
aircraft it has targeted. 
CMAPS General Dynamics 
Description CMAPS is a ground-based system designed to protect airplanes from 
MANPADS during take-off and landing. CMAPS uses a network of sensors to 
detect and verify the launch of shoulder-fired missiles and tracks those 
missiles with great precision. High-power infrared countermeasures are then 
directed to the missile, breaking the missile’s lock on the aircraft. CMAPS can 
protect against multiple threats, be rapidly deployed to any airfield, and 
operate safely in both forward deployed and urban areas. 
Table 25.   Examples of some ground-based CM systems. 
2. Airborne-based Solutions 
Today, network-centric warfare has become an important task.  When one 
aircraft detects a missile launch, this information can be sent to all other nodes, 
i.e., aircraft. The standoff aircraft carrying out their EW mission and other close-in 
aircraft, e.g., UAVs, can share this information. The position of the threat launch 
information can be automatically sent to the nearest ground security forces. This 
solution can be combined with other military operations. 
As a part of Project Chole, there are some tests ongoing to detect and jam 
missiles using a high-altitude UAV patrolling 60,000 feet above the airport in 
order to protect aircraft taking off and landing.72  
F. CONCLUSION 
A single solution for defeating the threat is far away. Therefore, 
expendables, suppression techniques, and onboard jammers should continue to 
be used for all types of threats. In the past, chaff, flares, or jamming systems 
were under crew control and used manually. Now the management of these 
systems requires a dedicated computer to coordinate all required efforts. as 
                                            
72 Doyle, 2008. 
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shown in Figure 66. Using onboard and off-board systems coherently enables 
better susceptibility reduction. Onboard systems can degrade acquisition, target 
tracking, and missile guidance functions. Off-board systems are used in the later 
stages, in the endgame, to decoy the missile from its target. 
 
 
Figure 66.   PMA272.73 
To form a suite for aircraft protection the needs are more power, more 
antennas, more sensors, and more expendables.  
 
                                            
73 ATRB, PMA-272's EW open architecture roadmap, 2007, 2. 
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VI. AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY AGAINST THE SAM THREAT 
Military aircraft are not built to fly in only normal situations. In a hostile 
environment, there are natural and man-made problems that the aircraft has to 
deal with to survive. If the aircraft sustains severe damage and can still fly, it is a 
survivable aircraft.  
A. DEFINITIONS 
“Susceptibility: The inability of an aircraft to avoid being hit by the hostile 
environment.”74 Susceptibility is related to a missile’s capability to hit the aircraft. 
i.e., an aircraft’s lack of capability to divert the missile and atmospheric conditions 
in which the missile and its guidance are affected. Following an aircraft until it is 
hit is the most important function of the missile. However, in the end, the aim of 
the missile is to shoot down the aircraft by giving damage. So its warhead and 
fusing system must have a capability to do so. In this point of view, aircraft 
vulnerability has a meaning. “Vulnerability: The inability of an aircraft to withstand 
the damage caused by the hostile environment.”75 The aircraft should bear all 
damages to survive.  
The steps of fight between an aircraft and a missile happen based on 
probabilities. In the steps below, everything is thought positive on the missile’s 
side: 
Acquisition: Air defense is ready at the battlespace, either alone or part of 
an integrated defense system, which communicates and exchanges information 
about the battlespace picture. The threat is ready to search for aircraft visually, 
by RF, by IR, or by other means. 
 
 
                                            
74 Ball, 445. 
75 Ibid., 603. 
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• Detection: Threat detects and acquires contact. 
• Launch: The threat identifies the contacts visually or via electronic 
interrogation, tracks a hostile target, prioritize the targets, and fires 
a missile. 
• Intercept: Fly the projectile to meet with the target. 
• Hit/Fuze: Hit the target or detonate the HE warhead by proximity 
fusing.  
• Kill the target or the target survives. 
So each step may also have a negative probability, as shown in Figure 67. 
The desired aim for the aircraft’s survivability is to break this chain in earlier 
stages. In other words, it must defeat the threat as early as possible because as 
the missile goes forward through the steps positively, it prevents the aircraft from 
conducting its own mission either by killing the aircraft or with some virtual 
attritions. Threats are on the scene to shoot down the aircraft and, if not, to 
degrade the offensive accomplishments of the aircraft against the platform that is 
protected. For example, a bomber aircraft bombing from a higher altitude 
increases its survivability but also decreases its offensive capability. Therefore, 
air defense reaches a virtual attrition. 
When aircraft are forced to accomplish their missions at higher altitudes, 
the accuracy of the mission is degraded. Flying nap-of-the-earth makes it harder 
for ground-based weapons system to acquire the aircraft. However, they are 
more susceptible to intense small-arms fire.   
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Figure 67.   Encounter between an aircraft and a weapon.76 
Aircraft may not survive if one of four essential functions (lift, thrust, 
control, and structural integrity) fails. Those are the vital functions that must be 
kept safe by preventing a hit on wings, tail, aerodynamics, engine, aircraft control 
rods, surfaces and critical system components. 
If an aircraft is hit by a missile and withstands the damage, it becomes 
more susceptible to other shots originating from different weapons in the 
battlespace. The occurrence of one event might be affected by another event. If 
the aircraft’s engine is damaged by a hit, its speed and maneuverability 
decreases remarkably. It becomes more susceptible to further shots. 
                                            
76 Ball, 11. 
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Survivability must be considered from the early design stages. Otherwise, 
it becomes more expensive and much more difficult to apply later. Survivability 
can be gained by a good design. Survivability should be thought of from the very 
beginning of the design. 
Implementing survivability enhancement features is difficult and 
expensive; however, they pay off by increasing the combat cost effectiveness.  
An aircraft should be able to complete its mission with some damage. This plays 
an important role. Another aircraft does not need to be sent and time is not lost. 
The asset is not lost. When it comes back with or without damage, then it can be 
sent quickly on another mission. 
Threat characteristics are threat types, warhead, and damage mechanism. 
The lethality of short-range missiles is affected by the distance at which  
the missile operator launches the missile. If the contact fuze missile is fired too 
early and the missile propellant burns out before it hit the target, it may not do 
much damage since it has low kinetic energy. If the missile’s shelf life has 
expired, then either the fuze or the warhead may not initiate the explosion. 
SAM damage can be reduced by early damage detection, classification, 
regaining the control of aircraft by reconfiguration, and use of different engine 
power adjustments to have an adaptive control. 
Some of the questions for assessment of survivability are: 
• How can susceptibility be reduced? 
• What is the vulnerability of large aircraft to SAMs? 
• Under an attack, which part can be hit? 
• How much damage can the aircraft tolerate?  
B. TESTING 
1. Simulations 
Open-loop simulations: human effects are in the loop. 
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Closed-loop simulations: human effects are not involved in this simulation. 
Several thousands of simulations can be run for statistical purposes and, 
obviously, they are faster than real time.  
2. Live-fire Testing 
Large aircraft vulnerabilities have been studied by the Large Aircraft 
Survivability Initiative (LASI). In these tests, pylons, wings, empennage, and 
fuselage are hit by missiles.77 Damage size and fire causes are the most 
important things that were researched. To defend the aircraft, the threat must be 
prevented from the very beginning to the very end of scenarioby preventing the 




Figure 68.   IR live-fire test.78 
                                            
77 Czamecki, 2005, 10. 
78 Ball, 171. 
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3. Recent Examples 
An Airbus, owned by European Air Transport and operated on behalf of 
DHL, was hit by an SA-14 SAM while climbing through 8000 feet shortly after 
departure from Baghdad. The missile struck the wing and penetrated the No. 1A 
fuel tank. Fuel ignited, burning away a large portion of the wing. To make things 
worse, the plane lost all three hydraulic systems and the pilots had to attempt a 
landing back at the Baghdad airport. After a missed approach, they were forced 
to circle the field until they finally landed heavily on runway 33L, 16 minutes later.  
 
 
Figure 69.   DHL aircraft was hit by MANPADs.79 
Although a C-17 is equipped with self-defense systems, in December 
2003, a C-17‘s left engine was hit by a MANPAD and caught fire. The plane 
landed safely back at the Baghdad airport. 
As part of the US/UK war with Iraq, missiles were fired on the Al 
Taqqadum military airport. On 4 April 2003, an Ilyushin IL-76 was reported 
damaged beyond repair. 
On 28 November 2002, in Kenya, an Israeli Boeing 757-300, after takeoff 
and passing 500 feet above ground level (AGL), experienced a “bump” then very 
                                            
79 Air Disaster, “Accident Photo: DHL A300 OO-DLL - Baghdad, Iraq,” 
http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/oo-dll/3.shtml (accessed 20 March 2008). 
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shortly saw two smoke plumes. The two missiles missed the aircraft because the 
terrorists launched the missiles too early; the missiles need 800 feet AGL to track 
the target.  
An RAF Hercules, XV179, departed Baghdad for a routine flight to Balad. 
The airplane was flying at a low level when it was hit by enemy fire. The outboard 
23 feet of the right wing separated and the Hercules lost control. It crashed and 
broke up. 
On 11 September 2004, the No. 1 engine of a C-17 was struck by ground 
fire shortly after takeoff. 
In January 2004, the No. 4 engine of a C-5 was reportedly hit by a 
surface-to-air missile. The crew reported excessive engine vibrations and 
declared an emergency. The plane returned to the airport and landed safely. 
 
Figure 70.   A C-5 was hit by MANPADs.80 
 
 
                                            
80 ASN Aircraft Accident, “Lockheed C-5B Galaxy,” http://aviation-
safety.net/database/record.php?id=20040108-0 (accessed 20 March 2008).  
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Date Missile type Aircraft type Notes 
02Jan99 Unknown C-130 UN plane shot down in central Angola 
26Dec98 Unknown C-130 UN plane shot down in central Angola 
10Oct98 SA-7 Boeing 727 Airplane struck over DR of Congo. 
15Dec98 Unknown An-12 An-12 struck by a missile enroute to 
Luanda. 
Table 26.   Some other examples against large aircraft.81 
 
                                            
81 James C. Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles (a,k.a.MANPADS),” 2006, 
http://www.stormingmedia.us/43/4351/A435164.html (accessed 11 January 2008). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. GENERAL REVIEW 
It seems like there is a countermeasure for every weapon developed. 
Electronic warfare presents a step-by-step sequence of events. Do not be 
detected. Nevertheless, if you are detected, then do not be acquired. Moreover, if 
you are acquired, then do not be tracked. However, if you are tracked, then do 
not let the missile launch. Nevertheless, if the missile is launched, then don’t let 
the missile hit the aircraft. However, if the missile does hit the aircraft, then find a 
way to survive and land the aircraft safely. 
Digital technology makes devices smaller, lighter, cheaper, more powerful 
and more integrated. This leads to more lethal weapons and countermeasures. 
This study focuses on the SAM threat. A SAM launcher can be a node within a 
large-scale integrated air defense system or an individual MANPAD surprisingly 
appearing in an unexpected time and place. Operation Iraqi Freedom shows that 
MANPADs, RPGs and small-arms fire are very effective against slow-flying 
helicopters and aircraft. 
 From the missile operator’s point of view, sometimes they are not sure if 
their target is actually an enemy. Therefore, many times operators face critical 
decisions to shoot or not, since it is hard to establish and radiate the actual 
electronic order of battle to all allied units in the battlespace. Misuse or problems 
with the programs may end with rare incidents of fratricide. Those problems can 
originate from a frequency mismatch, interference, system error, operator error, 
or misclassification. In order to eliminate operator errors, the speed and altitude 
of the target must be considered. 
The lifespan of a large aircraft is around 50 years. They must survive to 
remain in service that long. Large aircraft have large vulnerable areas. They are 
slow and not agile. They operate at different altitudes. Flying low makes them 
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even more vulnerable. As the vulnerable area of the aircraft increases, the 
probability of a hit increases. Armor and redundant systems may decrease the 
vulnerability of the aircraft.  
The ability to detect a threat is the one of the important tasks for 
countering. Threat warning systems can identify and prioritize the threats. The 
sensor must be located so that it can cover 360 degrees. 
Today, to counter a threat, an aircraft must have onboard or off-board 
countermeasures that use the RF, IR or laser portion of the EM spectrum. This 
situation leads to different distributed components and systems, which means 
extra weight and specialized maintenance personnel.  
A typical EW suite is composed of an EW management system, a missile 
warning system, RF electronic countermeasures, directional infrared 
countermeasures, countermeasures dispenser systems, a laser warning 
receiver, and the cockpit display. All aspects of these systems must be integrated 
to ensure maximum effectiveness. Logistics, training, operating environment, and 
system reliability should all be identified. To be one step ahead of the threat, the 
self-protection suite should be easily updated both in means of hardware and 
software. The suite should provide operational flexibility and interoperability. 
The EW suite can work against current and future threats as well as older 
threats. As times goes by, more agile and capable threats will be seen. Reducing 
susceptibility will always be a problem for large aircraft. As technology develops 
and the components of electronic devices become smaller, threats will proliferate 
more easily. As we saw in the latest examples in Iraq, MANPADs can be easily 
distributed to terrorists when the security of a country decreases. Therefore, 
aircrew and mission planners must know the basics of the technology that they 
use. 
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B. WHAT KIND OF SELF-PROTECTION SUITE? 
1. Solutions  
Single solutions are still far from defeating the threat. Therefore, for all 
types of threats, expendables, suppression techniques, and onboard jammers 
should be coordinated. Countering the threat in the early stages must be the first 
aim of a self-protection suite. 
For threat warning, a digital RWR, an IR-based MAWS, and an LWR 
should be employed. The digital RWR must be capable of detecting LPI radars. 
An IR-based MAWS gives better angle-of-arrival information and is also usable 
after the burnout phase of the missile. LWR can alert the crew to the presence of 
laser-guided weapons. Integrating the IR-based MAWS and the LWR may prove 
effective. 
For countering threats, it may be utopian to think that only one HPM can 
defeat all kinds of missiles for the time being. For large aircraft, it will be 
employed in the near future. For now, directed IRCM can provide enough power 
to defeat IR missiles and RFCM and towed decoys can more effectively counter 
missiles that employ even monopulse seekers. Dispensers and expendables are 
indispensible for endgame scenarios and for backup. An integrated EW cockpit 
display unit and a dedicated computer for managing self-protection give the best 
reactions against threats. 
The system must be lightweight, low drag, upgradable, reprogrammable, 
affordable, and have a low cost of maintainability and training. 
2. Future Threats 
In an otherwise low-threat environment, the biggest threat in terrorists’ 
hands is first- and second-generation missile technology. Eventually, they will 
have newer technologies and we must keep up with them and even use further 
developed countermeasures to be one step ahead. These are individual systems 
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and one cannot easily guess where they will show up. Multispectral multimode 
seekers discriminate the target signature. Low-observable missile plumes, RCS, 
and IR signature are used to avoid being detected and are becoming more lethal. 
In a high-threat environment, where more sophisticated and integrated 
systems are used, the threat moves to RF-based systems. They mostly have 
longer ranges, all-weather capabilities, and stationed systems.  
A combination of guidance systems makes it harder to defeat the threat. 
Multiple sensor-employed missiles will become more common in the future.  
Laser beams will be used to blind crew members unless laser-resistant 
goggles are used. 
Various types of self-defense suites are shown on the basis of aircraft 
platforms below. As the value of the aircraft and the importance of its mission 
increases, more countermeasure systems are added.  
3. Balanced Solution 
Every new system on an aircraft solves one or more problems; however; 
they also bring new burdens with them. The self-protection suite occupies space 
and adds extra weight, maintenance, and upgrade problems. A balanced solution 
must comprise low weight, low drag, minimal false alarms, long maintenance 
time between failure times, low maintenance time, and easy upgrades. Since the 
life span of a large aircraft is 50 years, it goes through some renovation over 
time. “Plug-and-play” systems enable easy integration. It also allows operators to 
add sensors easily or upgrade existing components in response to budgetary 
increases and/or changes in the threat environment. The impacts of structure, 
drag, weight, and electrical power requirements must be thought out before 
initiating countermeasures placement.  
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To modify a C-5 with a self-protection suite costs approximately one 
million dollars.82 But the loss of a large aircraft has many economic and 
psychological effects on both military and civil aviation. On the other hand, the 
damage caused by MANPADs in recent incidents show that IR seekers fly 
directly to the engine and the damage is limited to the engine. Where the missile 
strikes the aircraft and the size of the warhead are important factors.  
• What a pilot needs 
Aircrews need situational awareness, a digital map, and indications of the 
threats noted. They do not like the extra workload while executing an operation. 
EW suites must be easy to operate and should require little training time.  
• What an air force needs 
An air force needs current data so all the aircraft flying can see the same 
situational picture. There should be a low-cost, two-way data link between the 
aircraft and the command center.  
• What maintenance personnel need 
Plug-and-play systems that come with a long time between maintenance 
intervals and do not give any extra workload to the aircrew. There can be a 
dedicated self-defense computer that integrates warning systems with automatic 
countermeasures systems. 
It seems like it is not worth equipping aircraft with an EW suite in 
peacetime. However, it pays off in war. Large aircraft are made not only to fulfill 
the requirements for peacetime but also wartime. To complete a mission and to 
be ready for further missions, the susceptibility of aircraft must be decreased, in 
other words it should not get hit. If hit, it must withstand the damage to complete 
the mission and return to base. In order to have this survivability feature, it must 
employ an appropriate design according to the aircraft’s type. 
Further studies may include developing survivability guidelines for different 
types of aircraft. 
                                            
82 Thomas Freese, Force protection and strategic air mobility, 6. 
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